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This study addresses the questions of what factors impact diasporas' involvement 
in the development of their homeland and how diasporas demonstrate their support for 
that development by analyzing the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and its 
relationship with the homeland, Cape Verde. I contend that diasporas maintain different 
levels of engagement with their homeland. This connection changes over time, based on 
conditions in the host country and the homeland, thus affecting the level of intensity of 
diasporas' engagement with the homeland. 
The research findings complicate how we conceptualize political mobilization and 
community organizing. They incorporate informal social and political networks as viable 
ways for diasporas' involvement in homeland development, into the existing theories on 
diasporas, development, and the impact of remittances and brain drain. In the Cape 
Verdean case, informal transnational activities and networks are alternatives for this 
unskilled diaspora community that lacks the resources to flourish otherwise. This study 
also adds the Cape Verdean case to the broader scholarship on contemporary African 
diasporas. 
The factors conducive to diaspora investment in homeland development include: 
stable homeland government, policies that are inclusive of diaspora political participation 
and business investments, and diaspora support through diplomatic relations with host 
country. Since its independence, Cape Verde has emerged as an example for other 
African nations, with a stable democracy and steady economic growth, while introducing 
policies inclusive of its diaspora. Most Cape Verdeans in the U.S. have not yet adapted 
to the Western system of group mobilization and political participation through formal 
networks. Through elite interviews and a survey of the masses, I found that most Cape 
Verdeans are not registered voters and do not vote in the U.S. or Cape Verde, and even 
those eligible for U.S. citizenship, often opt not to apply. 
Although most Cape Verdeans in the U.S. do not participate in electoral politics 
and formal organizations, they demonstrate their connection with the homeland through 
social and cultural events, such as weddings, funerals, and sporting events. In these 
informal spaces, they engage in discussions and form opinions on issues related to socio- 
economic and political conditions in the homeland and host country. Within the few 
social and cultural organizations that support the homeland through fundraising and 
cultural events, the survey findings revealed there is an antagonistic relationship between 
the masses and leaders of these organizations. The masses demonstrated lack of trust in 
the leaders, while organizational leaders argued there is a great level of apathy among the 
masses. It might take one or more generations of academically trained Cape Verdeans to 
change this pattern, transforming the community from an unskilled to a skilled diaspora. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
This study is an examination of the broader concept of diaspora politics by 
offering a case study of the Cape Verdean community in the United States. It focuses 
particularly, on Cape Verdean community organizations in New England and their impact 
on Cape Verde's development before independence, during the independence struggle 
and since. 
This dissertation's title, Sodade, is a term used by Cape Verdeans to describe the 
feeling of yearning and longing for the homeland and loved ones they have left behind on 
the islands, in search of better living conditions. This sense of longing has permeated 
Cape Verdean cultural expression and has been immortalized in literature and song.' The 
word sodade describes the sentiment of nostalgia and also a bittersweet feeling that has 
no direct English translation. 
In the early 1900s, Cape Verdeans organized and mobilized on behalf of their 
communities in the United States as well as in Cape Verde. Mutual aid societies raised 
money to help Cape Verdeans in the U.S. as well as to send to the population in Cape 
Verde, stricken by long periods of drought and famine. During the struggle for 
independence, Cape Verdeans in the U.S. organized and demonstrated their support for 
and against the African Party for the Independence of Guink-Bissau and Cape Verde 
(PA1 GC) . 
' For more on Cape Verdean cultural maskers see Richard Lobban, Cape Verde. Crioulo Colony 
to Independent Nation (Boulder: West View Press, 1995), 75-80. 
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Although there is a strong history of activism, current Cape Verdean American 
organizations are not as active in the political, social, and economic development of their 
own communities in the U.S. and those in Cape Verde. There also seems to be a high 
level of apathy and a low level of activism and involvement of individuals in these 
organizations. Most organizations appear to suffer from financial woes, lack of support 
from the community and low membership. There is currently a low turn out rate of Cape 
Verdean Americans at the polls in the U.S. and in Cape Verde's overseas elections. 
Moreover, the relationship between Cape Verdean American organizations and the 
government of Cape Verde seems to be strained. With a history of activism on behalf of 
their communities and many successful examples in other immigrant communities in the 
United States such as the relationship between Irish-Americans and Ireland, it is 
important to study the connection between Cape Verde's development and its diaspora. 
This study also uncovers the political, economic, and social factors that affect Cape 
Verdean community organizations and their involvement in the development of their 
homeland. 
In an era of globalization, the study of Cape Verde and its diaspora is crucial to 
understanding the changing ethnic mix in United States. Cape Verdean Americans have 
played a major role in the history and socio-economic development of the New England 
region. To acknowledge this community is to acknowledge not only its impact on New 
England but also the major contributions it has made to the socio-economic development 
of the United States. Given Cape Verdeans' contributions to U.S. development over the 
centuries, it is worthwhile to discuss the relationship between Cape Verdean Americans 
and Cape Verdeans in the homeland. 
In his pioneering work on diaspora politics, Gabriel Sheffer defines modern 
diasporas as, "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host 
countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of 
origin - their h~meland."~ Robin Cohen explains that, "a member's adherence to a 
diasporic community is demonstrated by an acceptance of an inescapable link with their 
past migration history and a sense of co-ethnicity with others of similar ba~k~round."~  
With each wave of migration, new diasporas are constantly forming, growing, and 
creating networks in their host countries. Changing attitudes in pluralist societies such as 
the United States allows diasporas to do so. Due to more sophisticated forms of 
communication, the political, social, and economic activities of diasporas will only 
increase with time, and not necessarily disappear through acculturation and assimilation. 
Marxist and liberal theories propose that diasporas are a transitory stage of social and 
political development that will disappear with cultural, political and social tolerance or 
with the emergence of classless s~cieties.~ However, diasporas have proven to continue 
to grow. Sheffer highlights, "Certain ethnic groups which were losing their ethnic 
identity and their inclination toward continuous and organized existence and action have 
2 Gabriel Sheffer, "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics," in Modern 
Diasporas in International in International Politics ed. Gabriel Sheffer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1986), 3. 




revived their trans-state a~tivities."~ This holds true of Jews and Irish, for example, who 
have revived their activities on behalf of their homelands. In addition to reviving the 
relationship and activities with the homeland, diasporas also affect the nature of United 
States foreign policy activity towards their homeland. 
As a result of large-scale migrations across borders, diasporas maintain a 
permanent relationship with their homeland by visiting regularly, sending remittances, 
and political lobbying in the host countries, thus developing and maintaining trans-state 
relationships. In many cases, diaporas are also able to maintain a group identity. 
Diasporas are involved in national and trans-state politics, as well as cultural, educational 
and religious affairs, by forming organizations to promote these interests in the host 
country and their homeland. These organizations seek to preserve and promote their 
cultural, religious, and economic interests in both places. These activities are crucial to 
the survival of diasporas. 
While diasporas maintain ties with their homelands, Sheffer argues that the 
attitude of their homeland may not always correspond with the attitude of the diaspora. 
Diasporas are not always supported by the homeland. Such is the case of the expulsion 
of Indians in Uganda during the dictatorship of Idi Arnin in 1972, where the Indian 
government did nothing to mobilize in their support.6 Additionally, diasporas may not 
always support the homeland government, such as the case of Cubans in the United 
States and their opposition of Castro's regime. 
Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 1 1. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The central question of this research is: What are the connections between the 
Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and the process of development in Cape 
Verde? The following orienting questions have been developed as a guide for the study: 
How were Cape Verdean communities formed in the United States? What contributions 
did Cape Verdean organizations in the United States make towards Cape Verde's 
development before, during and after the period of armed struggle? What current 
contributions do Cape Verdean organizations in the United States make to Cape Verde's 
development? What have been the dynamics between the Cape Verdean community and 
its organizations? How has the Cape Verdean community perceived its relationship with 
the homeland? How have these perceptions changed over time? 
The assumption is that there is and has always been a relationship between the 
Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and the homeland. The form this relationship 
has taken varies based on the historical contexts of the United States and Cape Verde. 
The hypothesis is that diasporas demonstrate three levels of transnational engagement: 1. 
Cognitive (i.e. listening to the homeland's traditional music, hanging pictures of leaders 
on wall, spiritual activities, observing homeland's festivals and holidays); 2. Material (i.e. 
remittances); and 3. Political (i.e. supporting political campaigns, overseas elections, 
lobbying). Conditions in the United States and Cape Verde prompt or suppress the level 
of activities of the diaspora. There are political, economic, and social factors that impact 
the level of involvement Cape Verdeans in the United States maintain with their 
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homeland. These factors change over time, thus affecting the level of involvement 
towards the homeland. 
Although past and current literature focus on formal networks to track diasporas' 
involvement in homeland development in terms of remittances, my study focuses on the 
work of organizations as well as diasporas' informal transnational activities. This study 
demonstrates that as a labor diaspora, Cape Verdeans find spaces to cooperate, even if it 
is at the lowest level of intensity to promote their cultural identity in support of their 
homeland. 
Significance of This Study 
This research is important not only for analyzing the trends of the Cape Verdean 
diaspora in the United States, but also to the broader theoretical questions surrounding 
diaspora, race and ethnic politics. Diasporas face diverse experiences and conditions in 
their host countries which affect the level of activism they maintain with their homeland. 
Additionally, socio-economic and political conditions in their homeland also affect the 
relationship. Given the growing population of African immigrant communities in the 
United States, it is important to study individual groups and the potential impact they will 
have on immigrant politics within the broader U.S. political system. There are more 
Cape Verdeans in the United States, including migrants and their descendants, than in 
any other country, including Cape ~ e r d e . ~  This study on their relationship with the host 
' It is estimated there are roughly 500,000 Cape Verdeans in the United States, an estimated 
350,000 of which are in the New England area The population of Cape Verde is estimated at 436,000. 
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country and their homeland greatly adds to the existing body of literature on diaspora 
politics and the black immigrant experience in the United States. It departs from the vast 
already existing literature on remittances and the effects of the brain drain and introduces 
the concept of informal networks and political mobilization as intricate components of 
diaspora involvement in homeland development. The study on Cape Verde also enhances 
the literature on Africans in the diaspora. As a stable democracy with a steady economic 
growth rate, Cape Verde serves an example of development. Given its positive socio- 
economic and political environment, Cape Verde is able to foster a good relationship with 
its diaspora. In this light, it opens the comparative discussion within modern African 
diasporas as well as other island nations and their diasporas in the United States. Similar 
cases can be made for the experiences of immigrant communities from the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti. 
This study exposes the internal diversity and the increasing social-economic and 
political mobility of the Cape Verdean American community and identifies them as an 
ethnic interest group. Previous studies have placed all African immigrants in a 
homogenous category. This study adds the diverse experiences of the Cape Verdean 
diaspora as a case study to the existing body of literature on the African diaspora, and 
challenges the notion of homogeneity in the black immigrant experience. 
Lastly, Cape Verdeans have challenged and reshaped racial and ethnic 
classifications in the American society. The fact that Cape Verdeans see themselves as 
Cape Verdean Americans, as well as black, demonstrates their resistance to the American 
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tradition of a one-fold racial classification. This also challenges the definition of race, 
ethnicity, and nationality within American and global contexts. 
Definition of Major Concepts 
Cape Verdean American 
A person born in or whose parentslancestors were born in Cape Verde, but who 
now lives in the United States. Cape Verdean Americans consider themselves, as such, if 
any of their ancestors were born in Cape Verde. From the legal standpoint, Cape Verde's 
laws grant citizenship only to those born in Cape Verde and those whose parents were 
born in Cape Verde. 
Cape Verdean Identity 
They share with other people in the Portuguese-speaking world the commonality of 
language, religion, family structure and nati~nality.~ On the other hand, Cape Verdean 
identity and culture, which are expressed in food, music, dances, poetry, games, and local 
dialects, denote heavy West African influence as well as influences from European 
countries, in addition to Portugal. Understanding the background and cultural markers of 
the Cape Verdean society will give insight into the elements that bond the diasporic 
8 Richard Lobban, "A Synthesis of Cape Verdean Culture and History," Cimboa 1, no. 1 (1996): 5. 
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community together and create the identity which many have identified as Cape 
Verdeanness or Cape ~ e r d i a n i t ~ . ~  
Music is an important aspect of Cape Verdean cultural identity. Traditional musical 
and dance expressions include funana, Jinaqon, batuko, coladeira, morna, mazurka, and 
contra-danqa.1° However, the music has transformed since independence. The younger 
generation of Cape Verdean Americans has demonstrated a keen interest in their African 
roots. They have resorted to the use of African drums in this transformation. More 
modern musical expressions such as Cabo-love or Cabo-zouk combine traditional 
elements and contemporary sounds with French Antilles influence of ~ouk." 
Cape Verdean literature also symbolizes the uniqueness of Crioulo culture. Cape 
Verdean writers laid the foundation for the independence movement. The need for a 
solely Crioulo culture, not in relation to the colonial experience in addition to national 
liberation was expressed in poetry via metaphors. Founded in 1936 by distinguished 
Cape Verdean writers Baltasar Lopes da Silva, Jorge Barbosa, Manuel Lopes, and 
Eugknio Tavares, Claridade was a literary movement and publication which explored the 
sources of Crioulo culture and developed original Cape Verdean literature and free 
cultural expression. l 2  The subject matter included socio-economic analysis and 
commentary of the archipelago. EugCnio Tavares, for example, wrote almost exclusively 
Guenny Pires, prod., The Journey oj  Cape Verde In Search ojCape Verdianity (Txan 
Productions, 2005), documentary 
lo For more on Cape Verdean music see for example 
http://www.umassd.edu/SpecialProgsams/Cabovesde/cvmusic.html; accessed February 25,2008 
l 1  Timothy Sieber, "Popular Music and Cultural Identity in the Cape Verdean Post-Colonial 
Diaspora," Etnogrhfica XI (2005): 123-148 
l2 Lobban, 78-9 
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in Crioulo. This played a critical role in maintaining Crioulo as the language of the 
people. His morna, Hora di Bai (Hour of Departure) resonates the nostalgic and sad 
feelings of sodade among Cape Verdeans who are leaving the homeland in search of a 
better life. Since independence, Cape Verdean folklore and oral traditions such as Nho 
Lobo (Mr. Wolf), have regained notoriety. 
Cape Verdean identity takes different shapes once it is transported abroad. 
Depending on the historical context as well as the socio-economic conditions experienced 
by the diaspora in the host country, cultural markers are altered to reflect the impact of 
the host country on the diasporic community. The defining feature of Cape Verdean 
cultural identity is the Crioulo language. In the U.S., it is a way of preserving one's 
sense of being of mixed heritage and distinguishing oneself from American blacks and 
other immigrant blacks.13 Crioulo has also gone through transformations in its travels 
from Cape Verde to the U.S., and reflects certain nuances of the English language. 
Most immigrants group together as a community for social reasons. The Cape 
Verdeans community resides in most eastern states from Boston to Philadelphia, Cape 
Verde, Europe, and Americas. Networks are formed based on friendships, kinship, and a 
shared identity. This network is maintained by various forms of communication and 
contacts such as emails, letters, goods, and mutual visits. Women are key actors in 
maintaining the networks' activities. The role of women in maintaining informal social 
networks will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
l3  Deirdre Meintel Machado, "Cape Verdeans," in Hidden Minorities: The Persistence of 
Ethnicity in American Life ed. Joan H.  Rollins (New York: University Press of America, 1981), 227-252. 
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In the case of Cape Verdeans in the United States, the strict racial stratification of 
American society heightened the desire and need for Cape Verdeans to bond together and 
share experiences via a common cultural identity. Cape Verdeans were alienated from 
the Portuguese communities, by force, due to their darker skin. They were not welcomed 
in Portuguese churches and social clubs. Of course, those who were of lighter 
complexion, and could pass for white, did so. On arrival in the U.S., they distanced 
themselves from the African-American community to avoid the discrimination and racial 
oppression experienced by this group. In the end, they formed community organizations, 
churches, and social networks through which they could celebrate their culture, away 
from the European Portuguese and the African Americans. Congregating in the homes of 
members of the community, for example, afforded them a place where they did not have 
to explain or justify their racial background. It was understood they were "Cape 
Verdean," not black or white, just "Cape Verdean." 
Cape Verdeans perceive their identity to be unique, a mixture of African and 
Portuguese cultures. This blend is the focal point of their identity and community 
formation.14 Although Cape Verdeans vary in skin tones (very light to very dark), the 
commonality of the Crioulo language (once perceived as a sign of low social status 
and/or illiteracy), creates in their mind a unique cultural identity. Embodied in this 
explication of Cape Verdean identity is the symbolic connection and responsibility to the 
homeland. This connection mobilizes the Cape Verdean community on behalf of their 
14 David Baxter, "Some Strategies of Ethnic identification within the Cape Verdean Community," 
David Baxter Papers accessed via the Rhode Island College James P Adams Library Special Collections 
on Cape Verde. 
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compatriots and homeland. Immigrants and American-born Cape Verdeans have revived 
the responsibility to help those who stayed behind on the islands by sending barrels filled 
with goods and foods, as well as attending fundraisers on behalf of their homeland and/or 
locality. Cape Verdean Americans feel grateful to be given the opportunity to have a 
better life in the U.S. Thus, they feel the responsibility to take care of their families and 
compatriots in the homeland who are less fortunate. 
David Baxter argues, "the activities of daily face-to-face interaction provide an 
individual or a group of individuals with a setting in which to stage one or more 
characters or social identities."15 The process which he calls staging comes to life based 
on the actor's perception of his audience and how they view his performance. Baxter 
then defines social identity as, "the impression that an individual or group of individuals 
conveys to others in a particular social context" and the way this identity is conveyed as 
strategy of social identification. l6  
Waltraud Coli takes Baxter's social identity rationalization further in her 
pioneering study of Cape Verdean ethnicity.17 Coli makes the argument that ethnic 
identity is situational and it changes based on the conditions and realities of the diaspora, 
host country, and homeland. In addition, she concludes that there are several factors that 
impact ethnicity and the ways in which communities demonstrate their identity. 
l5 Ibid. 
l6 Ibid 
17 Waltraud Coli, "Cape Verdean Ethnicity" (Thesis. A.M.: Rhode Island College, 1987), 39. 
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Coli's observations add that ethnicity increases, decreases, and/or takes a new 
form in various contexts. Ethnicity increases as an instrument of cultural resistance to 
oppression, means of upward mobility, in-group formation as well as for members to 
receive recognition. On the other hand, it decreases when suppressed by a dominant 
group, restricts social mobility, lost via contact with majority culture, negative 
stereotypes, and with increased group marginality. Lastly, ethnicity assumes a new form 
over generational time, through dispersal as well as intermixing with other cultural 
sources. Thus, Cape Verdean ethnicity and cultural identity is not stagnant. It changes 
and transforms itself with time, generations and as a result of contact with other cultures. 
Cape Verdean Identity will be observed through the extent that individuals attend 
social and cultural events (parties, weddings, funerals, dance performances, art 
exhibitions), attend festivals and observe holidays, religious saints, hold membership in 
social and political organizations, level of fluency in Crioulo, personal knowledge of 
traditional and modern music, connection with homeland via contact with relatives and 
sending remittances, familiarity with Cape Verdean cuisine, attendance at kitchen parties 
(house parties), attendance in community's church. A lengthier discussion of Cape 
Verdean ethnicity and identity is discussed later in this chapter. 
Diaspora 
Although once defined as the forced dispersal of specific groups (i.e. Jews), the 
concept of diaspora is no longer applicable to only specific groups. Its definition has 
expanded to include a wider and more diverse group of people. Diasporas are conceived 
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as communities that are formed due to forced expulsions from a specific place of origin. 
Gabriel Sheffer explains diasporas as, "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing 
and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with 
their homeland."18 This place or homeland gains significance in the memory of the 
dispersed community and creates the basis of groups consciousness within the diasporic 
community. 
Past and current theoretical literature on diasporas focuses on the impact of the 
dispersal, relocation, and historical memory have on the development of the disporas' 
new identity in the new country, its host co~nt ry . '~  In her work, Gina Sanchez-Gibau 
explains that geographical dispersion as a defining feature of modern diasporas can be 
understood in terms of a historical moment that takes place which causes social change 
and alters the course of cultural history.20 In the case of the African diaspora, for 
example, this historical moment is marked by the common experience of slavery. For the 
Cape Verdean diaspora the defining moments in its dispersal history were the initial 
immigrations with the whaling industry as well as the forced labor migrations to S5o 
Tom6 and Principe. The larger part of this dispersal happened during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries as Cape Verdeans migrated to Europe, and the Americas. 
l 8  Sheffer, 3 
l9 See James Clifford, "Diasporas," Cultural Anthropology 9 (1994): 302-338; William Safran, 
"Comparing Diasporas: A Review Essay," Diasporas 8, no. 3 (Winter 1999): 255-91; and Robin Cohen, 
Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997). 
20 Gina Sanchez Gibau, "Diasporic Identity Formation Among Cape Verdeans in Boston," The 
Western Journal o j  BIack Studies (June 22,2005) http://www.goliath .corn; accessed February 18,2009. 
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The idea of diasporas also includes a desire of returning to the homeland. The 
return, most often than not, does not become a reality given that the same socio-economic 
conditions that drive the diaspora to migrate are those that prevent them from 
permanently returning to the homeland, as in the case of most groups from developing 
nations. A common feature of modern diasporas is the fact that they maintain strong and 
close links to the homeland based on this notion of a return. A more comprehensive 
discussion on diasporas is presented in the literature review. 
Development 
Development can be defined as progressive and qualitative changes that occur in 
society which improve the quality of people's lives and conditions. Within this process 
the following components must be present: 1. raising people's living standards, including 
their incomes and consumption levels of food, medical, services, and education; and 2. 
creating conditions conducive to the growth of people's self-esteem through the 
establishment of social, economic, and political institutions, which promote and protect 
human rights, dignity, and respect. Because the process of development is progressive 
and qualitative, various stages of development are often hard to measure.21 
2' Interview with Dr. Anthony Affigne at the office of the Program in Black Studies, Providence 
College, Providence, RI in October 2002 
16 
Past literature has defined development in terms of economic growth.22 More recent 
literature has included a more comprehensive picture of development by incorporating 
the distinctions between economic growth and development and has also taken the socio- 
political realities of individual countries into account. Political rights, freedom of 
expression, life expectancy, access to clean water source, infant mortality, adult literacy, 
school enrollment at all levels, and gross domestic product per capita are some of the 
indicators used for measuring a countries' development process.23 Increased focus on 
issues of concern to women, especially in the developing world, has led to the inclusion 
of gender indicators in the development process. Organizations such as the United 
Nations' Development Program (UNDP), have created a Gender-related Development 
Index (GDI) to supplement its Human Development Index report (HDI).~' 
Globalization has forced a global application of neo-liberal development strategies 
by developing countries as a way for these countries to be incorporated in the global 
market.25 The structural adjustment programs (SAPS) promoted by lending institutions 
such as the World Bank, carry certain requirements such as opening markets to foreign 
trade, privatization of state enterprises, down-sizing of state supported social services 
22 See John Rapley, Understandzng Development Theory and Practice in the Third World 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc ), 2007 and Todaro, Michael P Economzc Development, 6th ed 
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publications Company, Inc 1997. 
23 See the United Nations Human Development Report at http: //www.hdr.undp.org; accessed 
February 25,2008. 
24 See http: //hdrstats.undp.org/countrieslcountry~fact~sheets/cty_fs~CPV .html; accessed February 
25,2008. 
25 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W .  W. No~ton & Company, 
2002), 1-20 
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programs, and liberalization of capital market.26 These strategies are not attentive to the 
historical contexts, cultural traditions, political and demographics factors, and 
ramifications on the people it affects. 
Growth and socio-economic change also affects the physical environment. 
Competition among developing countries leads to exploitation of non-renewable 
resources under lenient environmental protection laws.27 Economic sustainability 
includes promoting an ecologically feasible standard of consumption. Human 
development without attention to sustainability would be costly to further generations or 
species. On the other hand, the world's current population must be cared for as well. 
Development is not just about human development or sustainable development. It 
is about sustainable human development where distribution of resources today and 
tomorrow is affe~ted.~' It is about improving the income, and the health of all segments 
of population: women, ethnic and religious minorities as well as the poor. Development 
cannot be determined only in terms of economic indicators. It has to be socially and 
environmentally sustainable. However, inequality between and within countries proves 
the absence of redistribution of resources. A more detailed discussion of development 
and its processes will be laid out during the literature review chapter. 
26 Ibid 




Development will be observed through political rights, civil liberties, freedom of 
expression and the press, life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, primary, secondary, 
and tertiary school enrollment, GDP per capita, access to clean water. 
Diaspora and Development 
Diasporas have existed for over twenty-five hundred years but the dynamics have 
dramatically changed in the face of a globalizing world. It has also grown as a major 
force for development. 
Diasporas accumulate human, financial, and social capital that can be used in the 
development of their homeland. Homeland governments can provide resources and 
create an environment where diasporas can institutionalize and utilize their resources in 
their respective homelands. This, in turn creates a strong link between diasporas and 
their homelands. Transnational communities establish and reinforce multifaceted links 
between their homelands and host countries. The challenge is to create an environment 
where there are incentives in encouraging the diaspora to engage in and contribute 
towards homeland development.29 
Diasporas can contribute by sending remittances, and supporting businesses in 
their home countries. Some work in skill sectors that are critical and in shortage in their 
home countries. Additionally, they have contacts with potential business partners in the 
host country, which can lead to the establishment of trade and production links that 
29 See the International Organization fbr Migration at http: //www.iom.int/jahia/jsp/index.jsp. 
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promote the market access of export goods from developing c~untries.~'  Lastly, diasporas 
can influence the host countries' economic and political policies towards development in 
their homelands. 
Financial capital accumulated by the diaspora is very often sent to the homeland 
to the benefit of its population and infrastructures. Human capital can result in higher 
education training and professional experience by diasporas that settle in developed 
countries. Additionally, human capital can also contribute to homeland development via 
the return of skills by return migration or through advanced technology in host countries. 
Diasporas create social networks and links between host countries and homelands, which 
gives the homeland access to more developed markets, thus encouraging foreign direct 
investments. Diasporas can play an important role in facilitating investment possibilities 
because they are familiar with the business processes in both the homeland and host 
country. Moreover, they can organize, promote, and encourage investments in the 
homeland. Lastly, the homeland's government is an important actor in building and 
sustaining a relationship with the d i a ~ ~ o r a . ~ ~  They can facilitate the mobility of diasporas 
by offering dual citizenship, long term residence permits, and multiple entry visas. 
Governments can also strengthen relationships with diaspora organizations. A 
comprehensive theoretical review of the literature on diasporas and development is 
offered in chapter two. 
30 Ibid. 
3 1  See the World Bank Website and the African Diaspora for Development Initiative at 
http://web .worldbank org 
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Diaspora and development is observed through, 1. Economic variables: monetary 
and in-kind remittances, businesses supported in Cape Verde, sending goods and money 
to community institutions (i.e. schools, and churches), investments in industries (resort 
hotels, manufacturing), vacation visits, attendance, donation to fundraising events on 
behalf of the homeland, and buying goods to resell in the United States; 2. Political 
variables: participation in electoral politics (overseas elections) and election campaigns, 
lobbying; and 3. Social variables: vacation visits, membership in Cape Verdean 
organizations in the United States, attendance in festivals and membership in social 
networks which support homeland. 
Methodological Procedures 
The central question of this research is: What is the connection between the Cape 
Verdean diaspora in the United States and the process of development in Cape Verde? 
The assumption is that there is and has always been a relationship between the Cape 
Verdean diaspora in the United States and the homeland. The form this relationship has 
taken varies based on the historical contexts of the United States and Cape Verde. 
Conditions in the United States and Cape Verde prompt or suppress the level of activities 
of the diaspora. There are political, economic, and social factors that impact the level of 
involvement Cape Verdeans in the United States maintain with their homeland. These 
factors change over time, thus affecting the level of involvement towards the homeland. 
To answer this question and to test the hypotheses, the methodology for this study 
is derived from both qualitative and quantitative approaches to assessing the connection 
2 1 
between the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States and the process of development 
in its homeland. This study focuses on the analysis of historical documents, personal 
interviews responses from Cape Verdean organizations as well as questionnaire responses 
from a subject population to determine the subjects' attitudes towards their relationship 
with their homeland. 
Subiect Population 
The subject population in this study consists of Cape Verdean residents in the 
states of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. These states were chosen 
because they have the largest concentration of Cape Verdeans. Qualitative data was 
gathered from elites at the organizational level. These individuals are members and the 
organizational leadership of the Cape Verdean community. The ten organizations to be 
interviewed were chosen from a list provided to the researcher that reflect diversity in 
demographics, and the services they provide to the community. One representative from 
each organization is interviewed. 
Quantitative data was gathered via a questionnaire, encompassing a sample of one 
hundred members of the Cape Verdean community, ranging from eighteen to eighty 
years of age, immigrant and American born, and from various generations. The sample 
population was created by "snowball" procedures from personal contacts within the Cape 
Verdean community and chosen to reflect diversity in gender, age, education and income 
levels. 
Instruments 
The study included both in-depth qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey 
questionnaire. Interview questions were open-ended and unstructured to allow interview 
subjects the freedom to provide additional information significant to the study. Personal 
interview questions with the organizations included size of membership, activities, types 
of services offered (whether they serve Cape Verdeans in the United States, at home, or 
both), nature of relationship with the Cape Verdean community, and Cape Verde and 
U. S. governments. 
This information was supplemented by a survey questionnaire to be distributed to 
a broader cross section of the Cape Verdean community. It highlighted the attitudes of 
the subject population towards political, economic, and social conditions in the host 
country, their relationship to Cape Verde, and their involvement in the development of 
their homeland in terms of politics, remittances and investments. Questions explored 
whether subjects held memberships in Cape Verdean organizations, their attitudes and 
patterns towards voting in Cape Verde's overseas elections and in U.S. elections (if 
subjects hold U.S. citizenship), sending remittances to family or government (local or 
national), and personal business investments. The question of citizenship is significant 
because it determines whether or not the diaspora has access to political participation in 
both homeland and host country, that allows it to have impact on policies and diplomatic 
relationship between the two countries. 
Data CollectionlAnalysis 
Rhode Island College Special Collections on Cape Verde contains historical 
documents (newspaper articles and editorials) as well as current and past academic 
literature (government reports, books, and theses). The New Bedford Whaling Museum 
in New Bedford, Massachusetts has a substantive record of ship manifests arriving from 
and departing to Cape Verde, as well as formal and informal communication between 
individuals, organizations, and government officials in the United States and Cape Verde. 
These records date back to the early 1800s. 
A historical analysis of these materials provided the basis for explaining past 
trends in the attitudes and behaviors of Cape Verdean Americans, their organizations, and 
connection to the development of Cape Verde in the periods before, during, and after the 
independence struggle. 
A quantitative analysis of survey findings provided the basis for explaining the 
current relationship between the Cape Verdean community in the United States and the 
homeland. Additionally, an analysis of the statistical data findings assisted in drawing 
generalizations about the dynamics between the Cape Verdean community and its 
organizations, the factors that impact the relationship between Cape Verdeans and their 
homeland, and the ways through which this relationship is maintained. 
Cape Verde: Country Overview 
The Cape Verde Islands are not well known to the rest of the world. The small 
archipelago of twenty-one islands and islets is located off the coast of the African 
continent, nearly 500 miles from Dakar, Senegal in West ~ f r i c a . ~ ~  Santiago is the largest 
island with an area of 383 square miles. Santo Antiio is the second largest island, 
followed by Boa Vista, Fogo, Siio Nicolau, Maio, S5o Vicente, Sal, Brava, and Santa 
Luzia. Its population is roughly 500,000, composed mainly of Crioulos, persons of 
mixed African and Portuguese descent. Although the official language of Cape Verde is 
Portuguese, the national language is Crioulo, an Africanized Creole of Portuguese. 
Figure 1.1 Map of Cape ~ e r d e ~ ~  
32 Lobban, 1. 
33~ni ted  Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, "Municipalities and 
Parliamentarian Training Program for the Improvement of Human Rights and Democracy in Cape Verde 
(1 997-1 999) ." http://www .unesco .org/danida/capeverd.htm; accessed July 23,2008. 
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Cape Verde's society and development encompasses a vast and complex history 
spanning a period of five hundred years. It is important to study this history in order to 
understand Cape Verde's current conditions. For the purposes of this study on diasporas 
and development, this history will not be discussed in details. However, one should not 
overlook the importance of the works by Carreira, Lobban, and others for an extensive 
and detailed description of this history.34 
Portuguese explorers arrived on the islands during the late 1450s and 1460s, 
establishing plantation settlements based on the use of African slave labour. The slave 
trade expanded during the eighteenth century when the city of Mindelo, S5o Vicente 
Island became an important port for sailboats and schooners crossing the Atlantic 
Portugal ruled Cape Verde and GuinC-Bissau as a single province from 1462 until 
1879 when each became a separate Portuguese province and the provincial government 
obtained greater autonomy. A nationalist group named the African Party for the 
Independence of GuinBBissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), the forerunner of the African 
Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) was founded in 1956, under the 
34 Antonio Carreira, The People of' the Cape Verde Islands Exploitation and Emigration 
(London: C. Hurst, 1982), Translation by C. Fyfe of the 1977 Portuguese edition; Paul Wayne Barrows, 
"The Historical Roots of Cape Verdean Dependency, 1460- 1990" (Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 
1990); and Lobban, 1995. 
35 Carreira (1982) and Deirdre Meintel Machado. "Cape Verdean Americans: Their Cultural and 
Historical Background." (Dissertation, Ph.D. Brown University, 1978). 
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leadership of African revolutionary scholar-activist, Amilcar ~ a b r a 1 . ~ ~  It struggled to 
overthrow Portuguese colonialism until 1975, when Cape Verde became independent.37 
The Struggle for Independence 
After World War 11, cold war struggles were on the rise. Local levels of conflict 
also increased with the East-West tension. England and France recognized that the 
period of colonization was over and independence took place for their colonies. Portugal, 
however, had a different vision. It still opposed all anti-colonial movements. As Cape 
Verdeans witnessed the decolonization process in other parts of Africa, they too wanted 
the same for their country. At this time, African scholars and activists began to strategize 
for national liberation. 
In the late 1940s and 1950s, the leadership in Portuguese-speaking Africa 
emerged with the appearance on the political scene of Eduardo Mondlane of 
Mozambique, Agostinho Neto of Angola, Amilcar Cabral of Cape Verde and many 
others.38 These scholar-activists began the much needed work on strategies for national 
liberation, to end Portuguese colonialism and fascism. Prior to World War 11, Portugal 
36 Ronald H Chilcote, Amilcar Cabral's Revolutionary Theory and Practice A Critical Guide 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 199 1). 
37 Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle (London: Heinnemann Educational Books Ltd., 1980), 1- 
45; Amilcar, Cabral, Return to the Source Selective Speeches ofAmilcar Cabral (New York: African 
Information System, 1973), 1-20. 
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supported German fascism in its quest to end radical socialism, although economically 
aligned with western capitalism.39 
Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, created 
ideological divisions in the socialist movement, leading to the formation of independent 
Marxist and socialist parties in Western Europe. PAIGC supported Soviet Union because 
it supplied it with weaponry but remained nonaligned. Although they were mainly 
influenced by Marxist and socialist thoughts, PAIGC only applied what was relevant to 
the local conditions. Cabral accepted the basic principles of the Marxist-Leninist theory 
of economic development. Moreover, his analyses of history, development, and society 
were grounded on a Marxist framework. He viewed Marxism as a methodology rather 
than an ideology.40 If Marxism was useful in analyzing the plight of GuinC-Bissau and 
Cape Verde, then it was relied upon. If it was no longer relevant, it was either amended 
or abandoned. In one of the many responses to the contentious question, Cabral stated, 
"If you want to call it Marxism you may. Am I a Marxist? Judge from what I do in 
practice. Labels don't concern us (the PAIGC). People are preoccupied with this 
question. The only issue is, are we doing well in the field?4 Thus, Cabral was less 
concerned with doctrinaire Marxism, and more concerned with its relevance to colonized 
societies. As he explains: 
39 Ibid 
40 Chilcote, 1-40 
4 1  McCulloch, Jock. In the Twilight ofRevolution: The Political Theory ofArnilcar Cabral 
(Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul plc, 1983), 133. 
We cannot, from our experience, claim that Marxism-Leninism must be modified 
- that would be presumptuous. What we must do is to modify, to radically 
transform, the political, economic, social, and cultural conditions of our people. 
We have to create and develop in our particular situation the solution for our 
country.42 
On September 19, 1956, PAIGC was formed with the purpose of national 
liberation and improve the harsh conditions of their homeland and population. The 
founding members were Amilcar Cabral, Luis Cabral, Aristides Pereira, Fernando Fortes, 
Julio de Almeida, and Eliseu Turpin. The leadership of PAIGC agreed from the 
beginning to have common objective of liberating and integrating GuinC and Cape Verde 
as they shared a common colonial history. This would be the beginning of a long lasting 
conflict between the two countries. The PAIGC started with a very small membership of 
roughly thirty people in Bissau and a few more in other cities.43 A large part of this 
membership was Cape Verdean and the central part of the party came from what Cabral 
called the petite bourgeoisie. These were civil servants, employees, and salaried 
workers." The work done by the Party during the initial phases was limited due to 
oppressive nature of Portuguese colonialism. 
PAIGC was the successor of the Movement for the National Independence of 
GuinC (MING), founded in 1954 by Henry LabCry and Amilcar Cabral. The major 
difference between the two organizations was that Cape Verdean independence was a 
42 Patrick Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People S War. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, 169, quoted in Amilcar Cabral, Our People are Our Mountains 
(London: Committee Doe Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea, 1971), 21. 
43 JOSB Vicente Lopes, Cabo Verde 0 s  Bastidores da Independencia, 2d ed (Praia, Cabo Verde: 
Spleen Edicaes, 2002), 20-30. 
44 Chabal, 175. 
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goal for PAIGC and not MING. LabCry later on formed the PAIGC's rival party, the 
Front for the National Independence of Guinea (FLING). By 1959, the PAIGC had 
gained major international notoriety with support from the British and Portuguese 
communist parties. During meetings in Tunis, the Movimento Popular de Libertagiio de 
Angola, Popular Movement for the Liberation for Angola (MPLA), and PAIGC joined 
forces in a common African revolutionary front for national independence. During this 
period there was also the emergence of other parties such as the Uniiio das Populagdes 
das Ilhas de Cabo Verde, Union of the Population of the Cape Verde Islands (UPICV). 
This movement sought the independence of Cape Verde alone and was against the 
integration with Guinea-Bissau. 
According to Chabal, the main aspect of the PAIGC's work during the initial 
phase was trade union activity. Chabal states: 
Luis Cabral, Abilio Duarte, Eliseu Turpin and others infiltrated the legal trade 
union, the Sindicato nacional de empregados do comCrcio e industria. They 
succeeded in winning election to the leadership despite the attempt by the colonial 
authorities to impose official  candidate^.^^ 
As a result of this small but significant victory, the Party began gaining notoriety among 
the workers of Bissau, especially dock workers. These workers organized and protested 
against poor working conditions and low wages. During a strike in 1956, they obtained 
higher wages. However, on August 3, 1959, during a strike in Pidjiguiti, Guinea, the 
Portuguese police and army opened fire, killing at least fifty workers and injuring many 
more. The Portuguese government viewed these workers' protests as the result of 
45 Chabal, 56. 
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possible political influence of the PAIGC. This event is known as the Pidjiguiti 
massacre. 46 
The Pidjiguiti massacre alerted the PAIGC to restructure and rethink their 
approach to the national liberation movement. The members lacked the military power 
and knowledge to endure a lengthy struggle. By 1961, Portugal began a 
counterinsurgency with political arrests, extrajudicial executions, commando raids, and 
psychological warfare.j7 Within his vision of a diplomatic transition to democracy, 
during 1960, Cabral called for a peaceful end to colonialism with open letters to the 
Portuguese people and appeals to the United Nations. The Party also asked for the 
support of the United States embassies and Congress. United States rejected any pleas 
because Portugal was its NATO ally. By July 1961, the Movement for Liberation of 
Guinea and Cape Verde, MLGCV, joined the PAIGC to become the United Front for the 
Liberation of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde Islands, FULGPICV. This union added 
much needed political experience to the PAIGC.~' 
The armed struggled was initiated in 1963, with PAIGC's attack on a small 
Portuguese fort in the town of ~ i t e . ~ ~  Within the first year of combat a large part of 
Guinea-Bissau was liberated. In an attempt to conceal Guinea and Cape Verde's colonial 
situation from the international community, in November of the same year, Portugal's 
46 Ibid, 70. 
47 Lobban (1995), 90-1. 
48 Chabal, 71 -87. 
49 Ibid, 92. 
foreign minister, Alberto Nogueira, issued a decree, stating that the two countries were 
overseas province, as extensions of ~o r tu~a l . "  
In February, 1964, the first PAIGC congress took place in the liberated zones of 
Cassaca, Guinea. The objectives were to develop the Party's organization and policies. 
Although the armed struggle was going well, there were internal military and political 
issues that threatened the survival of the Party and the success of the armed struggle. 
One of these issues was the abuse of power by local commanders. Chabal explains: 
Some local guerrilla commanders, after securing the area against the Portuguese, 
were often tempted to install themselves as local chiefs. Others exercised 
absolute control over a whole region by force of arms. They had no intention of 
following PAIGC instructions and they were in fact, if not by design, working 
against the party by seeking to eliminate traditional village authorities whom they 
disliked but on whom the PAIGC relied for political mobilizati~n.~~ 
The commanders who violated party principles were removed and prosecuted by the 
Party, thus solidifling the trust between the Party and the people. The most important 
decisions made during the Cassaca Congress, however, dealt with the reconstruction and 
economic development of the liberated areas. The PAIGC had to strategize on issues 
pertaining to its administration as well. The Congress increased the central committee 
membership from thirty to sixty-five members. In addition, it established several 
departments: armed forces, foreign affairs, cadre control, training and information, 
security, economy and finance, and mass organization. It also officially recognized the 
People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARP), created the People's Stores and expanded 
50 Ibid ., 92-3. 
5 1  Chabal, 78.  
medical and educational services. Divisions within the Party were suppressed and 
eliminated in the hope of achieving its objectives of state building and power 
The PAIGC celebrated major military victories from 1964 to 1967. It gained the 
military and political support of the newly formed Organization of Afiican Unity (OAU). 
Although there were major military victories, Cabral reached out to the international 
community in hopes of creating new alliances and exposing Portugal's continued 
repression of its colonies. In 1962, Cabral was invited to address the United Nations and 
present PAIGC's position, with the support of the OAU. Cabral's objective was to 
establish the legitimacy of the PAIGC as the only official party in the national liberation 
of Guinea and Cape ~ e r d e . ~ b d d i t i o n a l l ~ ,  he sought to isolate Portugal within the 
international community in hopes of putting an end to the war and colonialism. As 
Chabal stated, 
By 1964 a number of UN organizations had in fact taken action against Portugal. 
In July 1963, the Security Council had requested that member states refrain from 
supplying Portugal with military equipment which could be used in the colonial 
wars. Cabral's campaign, therefore, achieved notable legal success. But UN 
admonitions had no effect in practice. Portugal's NATO membership ensured 
that the major Western powers continued, until 1974, to supply Portugal with the 
weapons it required; this aid was significant since Portugal produced little 
military equipment beyond rifles and sub-machine guns.54 
52 Ibid. 
53 Amilcar Cabral, Return to the Source Selective Speeches of Amilcar Cabral (New York: 
Afiican Information System, 1973), 15 
In addition to the United Nations, Cabral and other African leaders met with the 
pope in 1964, to gather the support of the Catholic Church. PAIGC gained training and 
equipment support from Cuba, Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. It also gained the 
support of the rural population in Guinea, who supplied them with shelter, food, and 
water. 
In 1967, Cabral attended a conference in Cuba to rally further international 
political and military support. PAIGC gained support from the Cape Verdean diasporas 
in Dakar, Rotterdam, New England and other places. During the 1960s, PAIGC was able 
to secure much needed support from the growing anti-colonial activists in the United 
States. There was an attempt to incorporate the struggles of Portuguese and Southern 
Africa within the civil rights movement framework. However, civil rights leaders did not 
want to be viewed as communist supporters since the U.S. supported Portugal as an anti- 
communist NATO ally, not supporting liberation movements in ~ f r i c a . ~ ~  
Successful attacks against Portuguese forces continued from 1968 to 1970. 
Portugal retaliated with the assassination of Eduardo Mondlane of the Frente de 
Libertaqiio de Mogambique, Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in 
1969. In 1970, Cabral was invited to speak at Syracuse University during a tribute to 
Mondlane, who was a former professor at the same school. In his speech, Cabral spoke 
of the importance of national liberation for all African colonies. Cabral stressed: 
A people who free themselves from foreign domination will be free culturally 
only if, without complexes and without underestimating the importance of 
positive accretions from the oppressor and other cultures, they return to the 
5 5  Lobban, 95-6. 
upward paths of their own culture, which is nourished by the living reality of its 
environment, and which negates both harmful influences and any kind of 
subjection to foreign culture. Thus, it may be seen that if imperialist domination 
has the vital need to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily 
an act of culture.56 
The early 1970s marked a period of world wide anti-war movements against U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam. This created an anti-imperialist movement in Europe and North 
America. Other events such as protests in the city of Praia, Cape Verde as well as 
Cabral's visit to Lincoln University, in Pennsylvania, a predominantly African American 
university, helped to ensure the success of these efforts to gain international notoriety and 
end Portuguese oppression. 
The first elections were planned for August 1972, but did not happen. Portugal 
felt the pressure to contain the political and military victories of the PAIGC in order to 
maintain its colonial possessions.57 As a result, on January 23, 1973, Amilcar Cabral was 
assassinated by Inocencio Kani, a PAIGC naval commander, in front of his house in 
GuinC-Conakry. Cabral's assassination exposed a plot within the party to overthrow the 
party's leadership and seize control of the party. The plan did not achieve its objectives 
but did not disrupt the movement as those who had taken part in it were arrested. The 
party members were released by the Guinken police and re-established control of the 
PAIGC headquarters in Conakry. Chabal highlighted: 
The coup had virtually no effect on the PAIGC outside Conakry and, had it not 
been for Cabral's death, would have been of little significance. But because 
56 Cabral, 43 
"' Lobban, 96 
Cabral had been killed it must be seen as the most serious challenge to the PAIGC 
since the Cassaca Congress in 1964. 
The party responded to the loss of Cabral with attacks on Guiledge, an aldeamento, a 
Portuguese military camp and rural population concentration camp. It also destroyed 
Portuguese aircrafts and relief convoys. Even after Cabral's death, the party remained 
committed to independence. 
The second PAIGC Congress took place in July 1973, in Medina Bod. During 
this meeting, Aristides Pereira was elected the new secretary-general and Luis Cabral, the 
deputy secretary-general. At this time the constitution was being drafted. In September, 
1973, the First People's National Assembly proclaimed the declaration of state and was 
recognized by many nations in the international community.58 Portuguese General 
Antonio Spinola was asked to leave his post as military commander in Bissau. In 1973, 
the United Nations ordered Portugal to cease military activity in Bissau. GuinC-Bissau 
was admitted as the forty-second member of the OAU. In other parts of the continent, 
liberation movements such as FRELIMO and MPLA had also made great gains. 
Additionally, in April 1974, Portuguese military officers, driven by their own frustrations 
with the Portuguese government, overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship of Marcelo 
Caetano, who had continued the tyrannical regime established in the 1920s by Ant6nio de 
Oliveira Salazar, and began the process of ending Portugal's colonial empire.59 
The union of Cape Verde and Guine-Bissau did not take place as planned. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was strongly opposed to Cape Verde's union with the 
5 8  Ibid, 99-100. 
59 Ibid, 100-5 
Guin6-Bissau, out of concern about the Soviet Union's relationship with the two 
c~untries.~' 
Because the armed struggle was largely fought in Guink-Bissau, PAIGC had little 
military strength in Cape Verde. However, the Party was widely supported by the Cape 
Verdean population. Aguinaldo Veiga, a Cape Verdean lawyer, and his supporters 
expressed their opposition to the PAIGC and its supposed socialist agenda as well as 
Cape Verde's unity with Guin6-Bissau. Veiga and others in New England, in particular, 
formed the Juridical Congress, and became opponents of PAIGC." This group would 
later become the Uniiio Caboverdeana para a Independencia e Democracia, the Cape 
Verdean Union for Independence and Democracy (UCID). Another opponent was the 
anti-Soviet group, Uniiio das Populagbes das Ilhas de Cabo Verde, Union of the People of 
the Cape Verde Islands (UPICV). These groups were against decolonization and Cape 
Verde's union with Guin6-Bissau. In February 1975, during a closed meeting in Boston, 
the Juridical Congress declared Cape Verde's independence. Its purpose was to block 
PAIGC from assuming power in the Islands. PAIGC supporters were not allowed to take 
part. Lobban notes: 
According to the U.S.-based PAIGC support group TCHUBA, this Boston 
declaration was a desperate fantasy. Inside the hotel where they met, the Cape 
Verdeans expressed a fear of losing their property to Africans and "Communist 
insurgents." PAIGC supporters, gathered outside, were forcefully excluded from 
the meeting hall, which was accessible by invitation only. Once again, the deep 
6 1  "Juridical Congress Meet in New Bedford" in The Cape Verdean, August 1975,2, accessed via 
Rhode Island College, Cape Verde Special Collections. 
connections between the islands and New England brought both regions into the 
struggle for independence.62 
There were groups who were opposed to PAIGC. However, their membership and 
political weight were trivial. The high level of support for PAIGC in Cape Verde was 
demonstrated through protests, strikes, and political support from other liberation 
movements. 
Cape Verde's independence was set for July 5, 1975 with a constitution to follow 
within ninety days. Aristides Pereira was named the first president of the Republic of 
Cape Verde. After Cabral's assassination, Pereira was named PAIGC's top officer. 
Pedro Pires was a primary negotiator for Cape Verde's independence. He was able to 
gain some U.S. support by convincing the Congress that Cape Verde would not be used 
as a Soviet base. Additionally, he stressed Cape Verde's policy of nonalignment to the 
international community. Cape Verde's first Popular National Assembly elected Pires as 
the nation's first Prime Minister. 
The question of unity between the two countries was still inevitably present. 
Cabral believed the unification of the two states was historically and economically 
logical. He argued that the islands were largely populated by ethnic groups from the 
Guinean coast and had been under the same colonial government until 1789. 
Additionally, Cape Verde would benefit economically from Guinea's potential 
agricultural production surplus. In turn, Guinea would profit from Cape Verde's more 
educated and skilled people. 
62 Ibid, 105. 
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Between 1973 and 1980, PAIGC was in power in both Cape Verde and Guinea. 
Its unification and integration was taking place at a very slow pace. In 1980, an attempt 
to draft a constitution that could benefit both countries resulted in a coup by PAIGC's top 
military officer in Guinea, Nino Vieira. Guineans believed this constitution to be an 
attempt at consolidating Cape Verdean dominance in Guinea. Chabal emphasized: 
The Constitution, which Vieira claims was forced on the Guinean PAIGC despite 
widespread opposition, was unacceptable to the Guineans because it differed in 
two crucial areas from the Cape Verdean version: in the first place the Guinean 
draft reduced the power of the prime minister in favour of the president and it 
maintained the death penalty while the Cape Verdean version did neither; and 
secondly the Cape Verdean Constitution specified that the country's president 
must be Cape Verdean while its Guinean counterpart made no such reference to 
the nationality of the president. 
Nino Vieira perceived the language of the constitution as an attempt to consolidate Luis 
Cabral's (a Cape Verdean) dictatorship in Guinea supported by the death penalty for 
those who did not politically align themselves with his policies. As a result, the Cape 
Verdean government led by Pereira disassociated themselves from Vieira's regime and 
severed political ties with Guinea's PAIGC. Pereira gave up his rights as the leader of 
PAIGC and on January 18, 1981, created a separate party, Partido Afiicano para a 
Independencia de Cabo Verde, African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde, 
(PAICV). Cape Verde's PAIGC branch officially ceased to exist in February 1981 .63 
During the late 1970s, PAICV was viewed to some as a repressive government 
with arrests and execution of opposition party members and expulsion of opponents 
within the Party. Using illegal measures, it arrested members of UCID. UCID opposed 
63 Lobban, 112 
PAICV policies and deemed them to be anti-American and pro-Soviet. Articles written 
by John C. Wahnon of UCID: 
They noted grievances concerning: political prisoners in Cape Verde, the 
PAICV's association with international terrorism, the illegitimacy of the PAICV 
government, charges that the Cape Verde Islands were going to be transformed 
into a Soviet submarine base, cultural and political ties with Libya and 
Palestinians, and the expropriation of land.64 
Indeed, major agrarian reforms became law in 1982, opposed by UCID members who 
apparently were landowners. With all the criticism, PAICV was still making progress in 
the development of Cape Verde. There were improvements in education and health 
services. In addition, the Transportes Adros de Cabo Verde, Cape Verdean Airlines 
(TACV) was established with direct flights to Boston. 
Until 1990, the PAICV was the country's only legal political party. In that year, 
the Constitution was amended to allow a multiparty system. After elections in 1991, the 
Movimento para a Democracia, Movement for Democracy (MpD) became the ruling 
party. It retained power after elections in 1995. Since then, PAICV has regained 
leadership of the government. Table 2 on page forty-three offers major indicators of 
Cape Verdean development from colonialism through independence. The low population 
growth rate is attributed to increased Cape Verdean migration. 
Cape Verde lies in the same latitudes as the Sahara Desert and thus suffers from 
periodic droughts. In the two-hundred year period from 1748 to 1947, there were twenty- 
four years of famine. "In the drought of 1774-75, starvation claimed 22,000 lives; in 
64 Ibid. 
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183 1-33, 12,000 lives; in 1902-4, 15,000 lives; in 1920-22, 17,000 lives;"65 The hot and 
dry climate also makes agriculture very difficult. As a result, Cape Verde depends on 
assistance from Europe, Africa, and the Americas. Due to its limited natural resources 
and these extensive periods of drought and famine, Cape Verde's history is one of 
emigration. Table 2, depicts the economic make up of the country. 
65 T Bentley Duncan, Atlantic Islands, Madeira, the Azores, and the Cape Verdes in Seventeenth- 
Century Commerce and Navigation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 197. 
Table 1. Demographics of Cape Verde 




Population Growth Rate 
Life Expectancy at Birth 
Literacy Rate 
Creole (mulatto) 7 1 %, African 28%, European 
1% 
Roman Catholic 90%, Protestant (mostly 
Church of the Nazarene), and Muslim (2007 
est.) 
0-14 years: 36.1% (male 77,533lfemale 
76,489) 
15-64 years: 57.4% (male 120,208lfemale 
125,009) 
65 Years and over: 6.7% (male 10,226lfemale 
17,533) (2008 est.) 
0.595% (2008 est..) 
Total Population: 71 ..33 years 
Male: 67..99 years 
Female: 74.76 years (2008 est.) 
Definition age 15 and over can read and 
write. 
Total population: 76.6% 
male: 85,.8% female: 69.2% (2003 est,.) 
Migration Rate -1 1.74 migrants/1,000 population (2008 est.) 
Somce: "Cape Verde," World Factbook 2007, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs. 
<http: / /www.cia.gov/cia~publications/factbook/l (accessed 20 January 2009),. 
Table 2. Economic Characteristics of Cape Verde 
GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) $1.603 Billion (2007 est.) 
GDP per capita 
GDP Composition by Sector 
$3,200 (2007 est.) 
Agriculture: 9.3% 
Industry: 16.7% 
Services: 74% (2007 est.) 
Population below poverty line 30% (2002 est.) 
Unemployment rate 21 % (2002 est.) 
Industries Food, beverages, fish processing, shoes and 
garments, salt, mining, ship repair 
Imports $743.6 million (2007 est.) 
Exports $76.5 million (2007 est.) 
External Debt $325 million (2003 est.) 
Economic Aid Recipient $160.6 million (2005) 
Source: "Cape Verde," World Factbook 2007, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs.. 
<http: //www .cia govlcia~publications/factbooWindex.html> (accessed 20 January 2009). 
There is an estimated one million Cape Verdeans in the diaspora in places such as 
the United States, Portugal, and Holland. 
Cape Verde and the United States: The Historical Relationship 
Cape Verdeans reached the United States in the early 1800s with the whaling 
industry and established communities in Providence, Rhode Island, and New Bedford, 
Massachusetts. These communities remained socially, economically, and politically 
linked to their homeland by sending remittances, for example, which currently account 
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for twenty percent of the country's national income.66 In addition, the communities in the 
United States send barrels of food stuff and clothing to relatives, churches, schools, as 
well as for business. Commerce, transport, and public services account for 70 percent of 
the gross national product. In addition, although most of the population lives in rural 
areas, fishing and agriculture only contribute 10 percent.67 Given the above statistics, 
Cape Verde depends heavily on foreign aid for its survival. 
Cape Verdean Americans formed religious, social and political organizations that 
advanced issues pertaining to not only Cape Verdeans in America, but also those in Cape 
Verde. These social and political organizations were critical during the struggle for 
independence. This study analyzes the sources and types of organizations formed, their 
support or resistance towards the independence movement, the current trends like 
participation in electoral process at home through immigrant elections and remittances, 
and lastly, the paper analyzes the role of these organizations in influencing United States 
foreign policy towards Cape Verde. 
The major era of migration of Cape Verdeans to the United States took place 
between the mid-1 9th century and World War 11.~' In 1922, the change in United States' 
laws restricting immigration of people of color decreased the flow of Cape ~ e r d e a n s . ~ ~  
66 "Cape Verde," World Factbook 2007, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs. 
http: //www.cia govlcialpublications/factbooWindex,,html; accessed January, 20 2009. 
67 The United States State Department website. http://www.state.gov/r/pa~ei/bgn/2835..htm#econ; 
accessed January 1,2009). 
68 Halter, 22-45 
69 Raymond A. Almeida, ed Cape Verdeans zn America Our Story (Boston, M A :  The 
American Committee for Cape Verde [TCHUBA] 1978) 50-1 
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Due to this restriction, Cape Verdeans did not go back and forth to the islands as often as 
they had previously. Communication with their relatives in Cape Verde was limited. 
From 1922 to 1965, Cape Verdeans in the U.S. and Cape Verdeans in Cape Verde were 
estranged, with rare interaction, something foreign to Cape Verdean culture.70 
During the four decades following World War 11, Portugal neglected Cape Verde 
and the islands were faced with severe drought, famine and poverty. With American 
immigration closed, Cape Verdean citizens began to emigrate to Europe, South America, 
and West Africa. Labor agreements in S5o Tom6 and Principe allowed Cape Verdeans to 
work on those islands' plantations.71 Meanwhile, Cape Verdean Americans continued to 
send remittances and pictures of well-dressed and well-fed families, portraying the 
positive images of a much desired American dream. Cape Verdeans in America never 
mentioned the hard work and conditions they experienced at sea, on the plantations and 
factories.72 
The Immigration Act of 1965 allowed for the reunification of Cape Verdean 
Thus, many Cape Verdean families arrived in Boston, Brockton, Scituate, and 
New Bedford, Massachusetts; Providence, and Pawtucket, Rhode Island; Waterbury, 
Connecticut; and Brooklyn, New York. As they arrived, the vision of the American 
'O Ibid. 
71 Paul Wayne Barrows, The Historical Roots oj  Cape Verdean Dependency, 1460-1990 
(Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1990), 123-8.. In his discussion, Paul Barrows makes a strong case 
for the experiences of forced labor to SBo Tome. Although there were contractual agreements, many times 
there were deceptive and the conditions under which Cape Verdeans worked were extremely harsh, 
resembling slavery.. 
72 Almeida, 53-60. 
73 Almeida, 57 
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dream was replaced by the harsh American realities of racism, discrimination, poor 
working and living conditions, and political powerlessness.74 Although they experienced 
racism in the islands prior to arriving on American soil, American racism and its rules 
differed from the racism in Cape Verde. These differences will be discussed at great 
length later in the chapter. 
Cape Verdeans are the only group of African people who migrated voluntarily in 
large numbers to the United States before 1 9 6 5 . ~ ~  Deirdre Machado argues that the New 
England colonies made the initial contact with Cape Verde in 1643, during the triangular 
commerce of the seventeenth and early eighteen century. Cape Verde's ideal location on 
the Atlantic Ocean made it convenient for slave traders, pirates, and sailors. It is reported 
that roughly twenty-eight thousand slaves departed from Cape Verde to the New World 
between 1601 and 1 7 0 0 . ~ ~  Slave traders would fly the American flag to engage in trade 
until 1808, when England and the United States abolished the slave trade. After this 
time, many American ships flew the Portuguese or Spanish flags, because these nations 
were less opposed to the slave trade. Other vessels would camouflage themselves as 
whaling ships as late as the 1860s .~~  
74 Ibid. 
75 Marilyn Halter Between Race and Ethnicity Cape Verdean American Immigrants, 1860-1965. 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995, 1) 
76 Machado, 83 
'77 Kevin S. Reilly, "Slavers in Disguise: American Whaling and the African Slave Trade, 1845- 
1862," delivered at the Kendall Whaling Museum's Seventeenth Annual Whaling Symposium, October 17- 
18, 1992, Sharon, Massachusetts, accessed at the John P Adams Library, Rhode Island College 
46 
Rhode Island and Massachusetts (New Bedford and Salem) merchants were very 
active in the slave trade. Between 1696 and 1708, there were 103 vessels built in Cape 
Verde which made slave voyages to various parts of the AS late as the 1860s, 
ships were seized by the American African Squadron based in Cape Verde during the 
1840s and 1860s, created to patrol the West African waters for vessels smuggling slaves 
to the New World. Many smugglers were American t hem~e lves .~~  
In 18 18, American merchant Samuel Hodges established a partnership with Cape 
Verdean, Manuel Antonio Martins, where United States goods were smuggled to every 
part of the Atlantic coast of Africa. Hodges served as the first United States consul to 
Cape Verde from 181 8 to 1827." He became a very well known commercial figure in 
the Islands. Due to significant U.S. presence in Cape Verde, American sea captains 
showed little respect for the Portuguese, often by not paying taxes. In 1842, eighty-seven 
American merchant ships traded in Cape Verde in comparison to Portugal's sixty-one and 
Britain's thirty-six ships. Additionally, three hundred and thirty-eight United States 
vessels stopped in Cape Verde between 1851 and 1879.'~ They brought tobacco, flour, 
rice, cod, pork, buttermilk, soap, candles, cotton, paper, cloth, shoes, wood, dishes, and 
other goods from New England. Ships arrived from New York, Boston, Providence, 
Baltimore, Portland, New London, and New Bedford, on their way to West Africa, 
Madeira, Azores, Canary Islands, and Brazil to sell goods. 
78 Almeida, 1 1. 
'" Richard Lobban, "Cape Verde and the African Squadron," Cimboa (FalltWinter 1997): 13.. 
80 Almeida, 1 1. 
Ibid. 
By 1832, ships returning to the United States were reporting that large numbers of 
Cape Verde's population were dying of starvation. Portugal did not come to Cape 
Verde's immediate aid, thus Cape Verdeans made public pleas for U.S. support. 
Merchant ships from Boston offered to carry food and other necessary goods to Cape 
Verde. Donations poured in from Boston, Portland, Maine, Newburyport, New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, the YMCA and the Catholic Church. Aid also arrived from 
Brazil, the African coast, and Canary 
Despite all types of support from many parts of the world, thirty thousand Cape 
Verdeans died, out of a population of three hundred thousand. The island of Santo Antgo 
was affected the most, with the famine claiming eleven thousand of its twenty-six 
thousand  inhabitant^.^^ Rain did come in 1856, however, by then one quarter of the 
population had already died of cholera, smallpox, and famine. Cape Verde's economy 
suffered a major decline. It exhausted its finances on importing foods. Salt, its only 
export commodity was almost completely wiped out. The Portuguese Government 
placed heavy restrictions on import and export. Machado states: 
The importation of many goods, including cloth and shoes was prohibited and 
exorbitantly high import duty was set for other goods. Moreover, foreign 
merchandise was to be brought to Cape Verde only in Portuguese vessels. To 
exacerbate the situation, higher taxes were placed on Cape Verdean exports to the 
metropole and preference given to Brazilian products over those of Cape Verdes, 
affecting the trade in coffee grown in Fogo, aguardente (sugar cane rum), and 
animal hides, leaving these last to lie rotting in the 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid, 14. 
84 Machado, 99. 
It was then that Cape Verdeans began to leave Cape Verde in massive numbers, in search 
of a better life. 
Cape Verdean Americans have played a significant role in the development of 
Cape Verde. Since the early 19th century Cape Verdeans have worked as whalemen, on 
the cranberry bogs, and as factory workers in the northeastern United States. They 
would, often send remittances (both of money and goods) back to their homeland. In 
1941, the amount of remittances was delineated in an executive order by the Portuguese 
government in an agreement with the U.S. government. It stated that remittances were 
only to be sent to families. Cape Verdeans could only send one hundred dollars per 
month, additional twenty dollars per child, but not to exceed two hundred dollars 
monthly.85 
Living conditions in the islands under Portuguese colonialism was very poor. 
Portugal did very little to support growth and, at times, prevented Cape Verdeans from 
taking control over their own economic destiny. During harsh periods of drought and 
famine from the nineteenth century through the mid-twentieth century, Cape Verdeans 
made desperate appeals of solidarity to their compatriots in the United States. One 
account from 194 1 stated: 
Sons of S. Nicolau in America! Listen to the painful plea of your hungry and 
impoverished brothers. Knock on each others' doors and unite your efforts, and 
contribute so that your brothers do not disappear in this famine. Help your 
85 "Noticia Muito Importante: Remessas de Dinheiro Para Portugal, Madeira, Aqores e Cabo 
Verde," September 6,1941 (New Bedford Whaling Museum MSS B92-1, Portuguese Immigration 
Records, Box 8). 
brothers with money, foods, and clothing, because they need everything. And in 
the other islands, Fogo and Santo Antiio, which also experience great misery. 
Open your giving and charitable hearts and your souls to these people, the voice 
of misery of those who suffer in the islands, principally the island of S. Nicolau. 
Each delayed month, represents hundreds of lives for the valley of death.86 
Cape Verdean Americans joined forces and created several organizations, mutual 
aid societies, and committee and relief funds to help raise money and purchase goods to 
send to the islands. In addition to raising monetary support, Cape Verdean American 
organizations disseminated information to raise awareness on the severe conditions of 
Cape Verdeans in Cape Verde. The Cape Verdean Beneficent Association of New 
Bedford, founded in 1916, is the oldest Cape Verdean community organization. This 
organization was instrumental in bringing other Cape Verdean organizations together, to 
raise money and send aid to Cape Verde. Often, money was raised through socials, 
community picnics, and appeals for donations. Other Cape Verdean organizations of the 
early 1900s include the Cape Verdean Ultramarine Band Club, the Cape Verdean 
Woman's Social Club, the Cape Verdean American Veterans Association, and the 
Comissiio Pro-Necessitados de Cabo Verde (Commission to aid the Needy of Cape 
~ e r d e ) . ' ~  Some of these organizations remained active throughout the decades. 
There was a significant level of political and social activism on the part of these 
organizations, which attracted individuals and institutions in the United States to join 
forces in support of this small archipelago plagued by drought, famine, and extreme 
86 Joaquim Rosario Costa, "Apelo Aos Bons Cabo Verdeanos Na America," (New Bedford 
Whaling Museum MSS B92-1, Portuguese Immigration Records, Box 8). 
87 Please see www.umass.edu/cvsa, Cape Verdean Student Organization Website, CVSA, 
University of Massachusetts at Amherst; accessed March 12,2008 
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poverty. American organizations such as the Red Cross came to the aid of the Cape 
Verde Relief Fund after their efforts to bring ten thousand dollars worth of supplies they 
had collected to Cape Verde, were abandoned by the Portuguese colonial powers. The 
Red Cross spoke of their commitment to end the harsh conditions in Cape Verde: 
Even though the wartime needs of the American Red Cross are the most vital 
factor in the picture, in the present campaign for funds, the Red Cross must also 
stand ready, war or no war, to meet the problems arising from peacetime disaster 
in this country. Its mission, year in and year out, always has been to help the 
victims of natural disaster in this country and e l~ewhere .~~  
The Red Cross secured a vessel, paid for shipping costs and licenses, and distributed all 
the supplies, island by island. 
Between the 1950s and 1970s, Cape Verdean American organizations shifted 
their focus towards the education of Cape Verdean Americans on Cape Verde politics 
and culture. The end of World War I1 marked the beginning of the African 
decolonization period. Cape Verde had its own independence movement from 
Portuguese colonialism. Organizations such as the American Committee for Cape Verde, 
TCHUBA, were instrumental in educating Cape Verdeans-Americans about their history, 
Cape Verde's socio-economic conditions and colonial situation. Other Cape Verdean 
organizations during this period included Cape Verde Islands Relief Association, the 
Cape Verdean American Federation, and the PAIGC National Support Committee U.S.A. 
TCHUBA, Cape Verdean newspapers and other social, religious, and political 
"Red Cross Aid to Cape Verde Relief Explained by Chairman," The Standard-Times, March 23,  
1944, 16, (New Bedford Whaling Museum MSS B92-1, Portuguese Immigration Records, Box 8) 
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organizations, instrumental during the independence movement, will be discussed later 
on at greater length. 
In the early 1800s Cape Verdean seamen settled in New Bedford, New England's 
main whaling city. The first Cape Verdeans to arrive in the United States were mainly 
from the island of Brava. Halter explains the connection of this phenomenon to the 
whaling industry: 
It was the geographic features of the island that initially brought the whaling 
vessels to its ports. Once this link was solidified, the chain migration followed 
quite naturally and the Packet Trade boats continued to travel the same routes, 
docking at ~ r a v a . ' ~  
Table 3 demonstrates the number of Cape Verdean emigrants from Cape Verde and 
immigrants to New Bedford. 
89 Halter, 43. 
Table 3. Emigration from the Cape Verde Islands/Immigration to New Bedford, 
Massachusetts, by Island, 1900-1 920 
Island of Origin Emigrating from Immigrating to 
the Islands (%) New Bedford (%) 
Brava 32.6 28.6 
Fogo 28.5 25.6 
Siio Tiago 14.5 12.4 
Siio Vicente 11.7 2.6 
Siio Nicolau 9.2 8.6 
Santo Antiio 4.6 4.0 
Source: Halter, 42. 
In his discussion, Ivan T. Sanderson refers to the work ethic and skills of the Cape 
Verdean Whaler: 
In almost all crews the Negro African figured very prominently, those from 
Portuguese West Africa proved particularly outstanding as whalemen. They 
usually far surpassed all others of whatever racial or national origin in this art, and 
many of them settled along the New England coast, where they became known, 
and still are known, as Bravas, which, for once, is more a term of endearment than 
of opprobrium.90 
Feri Felix Weis contrasts this definition of the Bravas, by highlighting that: 
A Brava is not, as you may think, a Venetian "bravo" who was hired by the Doge 
of Venice to dispatch a "friendly enemy" with the timely aid of a dagger. The 
name Brava describes a most peaceful individual, who comes here to work and to 
be content with almost nothing, because he is used to nothing at home.g1 
90 Ivan T. Sanderson. Follow the Whale (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 262.. 
91 Felix Feri Weis. The Sieve on Revelations o j  the Man Mill Being the Truth about American 
Immigration (Boston: The Page Company, 1921), 287. 
Cape Verdeans lived near the docks in flophouses and took on jobs associated with 
shipping and shipbuilding. They also bought schooners and brought other Cape 
Verdeans to the United States to work on the cranberry bogs of Cape Cod and mills of 
New Bedford. Ten or more ships made annual trips between Southeast New England and 
Cape ~ e r d e . ~ ~  The ships would arrive in the United States early summer before the 
cranberry season and returned after the harvest in the fall. They would return to Cape 
Verde with clothing, household goods, roof tiles, and other U.S. products. The trade was 
known as the Brava Packet Trade, since most of the ships during this period departed 
from the island of Brava. Cape Verdeans in America: Our Story, its significance is 
described: 
The importance of the packets was far more than commercial. It was these fragile 
vessels, above all else, that nurtured a Cape Verdean American connection, 
making it possible for new immigrants to resolve a dilemma that deeply 
concerned many of them: how to make a new life for oneself in America without 
abandoning those left behind in the homeland. For one thing packets made visits 
home a possibility and this kept alive the dream many held dear of returning one 
day to live in the Islands as a prosperous mercano (American). For another, the 
packets, allowed immigrants to provide most of life's necessities-and some 
luxuries-to relatives in their home island. These.. .were a lifeline between the 
immigrants and those who remained in Cape Verde. For the latter, they brought 
the material goods necessary for physical life, but just as importantly, for the 
lonely greenhorn, the packets enabled him to stay in contact with home and with 
the way of life that was part of his very identity.g3 
92 William P Dillingham "Cape Cod, Massachusetts; Bravas, or Black Portuguese, Cranberry 
Pickers," chapter 7 in Immigrants in Industries, Report of the Immigration Commission, Recent Immigrants 
in Agriculture, Vol. 22 (191 1) and Christinan John Bannick, "Portuguese Immigration to the United States: 
Its Distribution and Status" (Thesis, University of California, 191 7), 62-7. 
93 Almeida, 30-1 . 
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Ant6nio Coelho was the first Cape Verdean American to purchase a vessel and 
make it possible for Cape Verdeans not only to travel but to send goods back to the Cape 
Verde Islands as well as pick up new immigrants.94 He purchased the Nelly May and 
sailed in 1892 from Providence to Brava. There were fifteen passengers on this vessel 
who paid fifteen dollars each for the trip.95 Due to rough conditions, it took the vessel 
roughly forty-five days to reach the islands. On its way back to the United States, the 
voyage lasted only twenty-eight days. It reached Providence with one hundred and 
seventeen passengers. 
The most noted of these ships in the Cape Verdean packet trade was the schooner 
Ernestina, which sailed as late as the 1960s, carrying Cape Verdeans as well as goods 
between the Islands and the United Built in 1894, the Ernestina is more than 
one century old and is listed in the National Register of Historic Places. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, more and more factories were built in New 
Bedford. Business was booming and factories required more workers. Due to this 
demand for factory workers Cape Verdeans were encouraged to come to the United 
States to work. This marked a period of increased migration of Cape Verdeans to the 
U.S. Due to the high costs of the voyage, poor peasant families would combine their 
financial resources and send one family member, frequently a young male, to America. 
These young men would leave Cape Verde in their teens and return decades later, as 
94 Michael Cohn and Michael K .  H.  Platzer Black Men ofthe Sea (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1978), 93. 
95 Ibid. 
96 James P Delgado "Ernestina." National Historical Landmark Study, 1990. 
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adults, to establish households after having saved money in America. Those who were 
already married would come to see their wives and children every few years. In many 
cases, men would spend decades abroad, only returning in old age.97 For many Cape 
Verdeans, the dream was to work in America, save money, and set up a house in Cape 
Verde with American goods. 
By 191 1, an estimated five hundred Cape Verdeans would go to Cape Verde each 
year and return to the United States. This period of cyclical migration was problematic 
for record keeping and accurate information on the actual numbers of Cape Verdeans 
who migrated to the United States for the first time. Table 4 on page fifty-six 
demonstrates this. 
97 Almeida, 49 
Table 4. Departures from the Cape Verde Islands and 
Arrivals to New Bedford, Massachusetts, 1900- 1920 
























Source: Halter, 41 (1995). 
Because it was an overseas province, records show Portugal listed as the country 
of origin for all Cape Verdeans. There were also many clandestine departures by Cape 
Verdeans who could not afford the trip cost or who were attempting to avoid conscription 
into the Portuguese military. Still, many entries in the United States were unrecorded. 
5 7 
The inconsistencies are also demonstrated on the table below with conflicting figures 
from the United States Immigration Service and migration records in Cape Verde. 
Table 5. Cape Verdean Immigration to the United States, 1 9 12- 1 920 
Exits from Cape Verde to U.S. 10,870 
Entries of Black Portuguese Aliens to U.S. 7,798 
Difference 3082 
Source: Deirdre Meintel Machado. "Cape Verdean Americans: Their Cultural and Historical Background. 
Dissertation," Ph.D. Brown University, 1978,245 
Often U.S. officials would use typical American categories of black and white to 
classify newcomers. This was problematic because Cape Verdeans held Portuguese 
passports until 1975, the year of Cape Verde's independence from Portugal. Those who 
seemed white were labeled as European Portuguese by U.S. officials. Those who looked 
black were known as the Bravas or black Portuguese as most Cape Verdeans were called 
at this time. By the 1920s, African-born blacks in New Bedford formed more than two- 
fifths of the population classed as Negro by the Federal Reid discusses the 
antagonistic relationship between the Azoreans and Cape Verdeans: 
The Portuguese from the Azores consider themselves far superior to those from 
Cape Verde, who they look upon as Portuguese Negroes, though neither group 
considers itself negro. Azoreans are fair of complexion, largely olive-skinned 
with straight black or brown hair. The Cape Verdeans range from brown to black, 
with hair varying from the long straight black to the short and different variety.99 
98 Ira A. Reid. The Negro Immigrant: His Background, Characteristics, andSocial Adjustment, 
1899-19.3 7 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 104-5. 
99 Ibid. 
The racial stratification issues in the United States would become the basis of Cape 
Verdean identity struggle in the United States. This phenomenon will be discussed in 
depth, in a separate section. As Almeida asserts: 
This early failure of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to institute 
procedures which would identifl Cape Verdeans as a distinct ethnic cultural 
group and as a multi-racial people with a geographic land of origin would form 
the basis for many problems they would have as a people in their new 
homeland. loo 
Migration increased between the U.S. and Cape Verde. In contrast to the above 
mentioned figures, a 191 1 report calculated as many as fifteen hundred Cape Verdeans 
arriving in the New England area on an annual basis as well as an estimated population of 
ten to fifteen thousand Cape Verdeans in the Southeastern Massachusetts in 1912.1°' 
During this period, many Cape Verdeans arrived in the United States under contract as 
laborers in the cranberry bogs and the cotton mills in towns such as New ~edf0rd. l '~  
Cape Verdeans were considered hardworking, obedient, and docile as well as a source of 
cheap labor. They replaced the Americans, Italians, Polish, and Finns. The average pay 
for a seven hour working day during harvest was between $1.40 and $1.75 for a hand 
picker and from $3.00 to $5.25 for a scoop picker.103 In addition to the bogs, their 
loo Almeida, 5 1 .. 
101 Dillingham, 539-54. 
102 Ibid and "We Salute the Cranberry Industry: A Cape Verdean Creation," The Cape Verdean, 
March 1975,7. Cape Verdean Special Collections, Rhode Island College. 
lo3 Ibid, 546. 
working conditions in the factories were far from optimal. Many died of diseases such as 
pneumonia and tuberculosis caused by these living conditions. As highlighted in this 
account: 
The conditions in the dingy barracks set up to receive these workers were scarcely 
better. Unmarried were forced to live in bare barracks rooms, sleeping in shifts. 
Large families would share houses where only one family previously lived. Most 
of the houses where Cape Verdeans lived in the South End of New Bedford were 
without toilets and the city made no provision for disposing of garbage and waste. 
The infant mortality rate was very high and schooling was not encouraged for the 
Cape Verdeans. It is scarcely surprising that these immigrants were more 
discouraged and less ambitious than their predecessors, as Black-Americans 
particularly were experiencing the full brunt of the economic depression. 
Conditions were similar for the Cape Verdeans who came to work in the 
cranberry fields. Housing was often rude company owned shacks build to give a 
minimum of shelter and a maximum of profit for the bog owners. Many pickers, 
unused to American food and climate, died at the bogs of diseases caused partly 
by these poor living conditions.lo4 
The strict immigration laws of the 1920s closed U.S. borders to immigrants of 
color and thus substantially curtailed new Cape Verdean migration to the United States. 
Few Cape Verdeans entered the United States and those who were already here were 
afraid to visit the islands unless their immigration papers were legal. Cape Verdeans 
began moving to other areas and establishing communities in industrial cities such as 
New Haven, New York City, New Jersey textile cities, Pennsylvania steel towns, and 
Ohio rubber manufacturing centers. Cape Verdeans also settled in Providence and 
worked at paper and clothing factories as well as on the docks. By the 1920s, whaling 
was not as significant to the world economy as in previous times. Modern shipping 
emerged as a new form of business. Cape Verdeans became a central source of labor in 
'04 Almeida, 5 5 .  
this industry. Manuel Q. Ledo, who was Australian and Cape Verdean arrived in 
Providence from New Bedford, and worked as a business agent for the international 
Laborer's union.lo5 In his account of the history of the Longshoremen's Union, Sam Beck 
explains Ledo's significance in organizing and creating the Union: 
He allegedly pulled a strike when the Industrial National Bank was being built in 
downtown Providence in 1929. His involvement in waterfront work inspired him 
to organize his fellow workers into a united body, which on November 13, 1933 
formally became the International Longshoremen's Association Local 1329. 
While Ledo could not control the unpredictability of ship arrivals, he was able to 
secure greater safety and support for those injured and a pay scale that provide 
people with a more equitable standard of life.lo6 
While Manuel Q. Ledo and many other Cape Verdean Americans settled in Providence, 
others joined friends and families in California. The abolition of the discriminatory laws 
of the 1920s and the enactment of the new immigration laws of 1965 stimulated renewed 
Cape Verdean migration to the U.S. 
Cape Verdeans and the Identity Question 
In his study of Cape Verdean identity in New Bedford, David Baxter explains that 
Cape Verdeans viewed themselves in terms of their unique cultural and phenotypical 
diversity. 
' 0 5  Sam Beck. "Longshoremen's Union, Local 1329" in A History oJ'Rhode Island Working 
People ed. Paul Buhle, et al. (Providence, RI: Institute for Labor Studies and Research, 1983), 76. 
'06 Ibid., 77. 
Cape Verdeans see themselves as a unique blend of European and African 
elements. On the other hand, they share with other peoples of the Portuguese 
world a common national language, state religion, family structure and 
nationality. On the other hand, Cape Verdean foods, music, dances, poetry, 
games, and localized dialects reflect many West African influences, as well as 
few influences from European countries other than Portugal. Cape Verdeans 
explain this unique cultural blend with reference to several factors. 1) the location 
of the Cape Verde Islands as a supply stop for international shipping; 2) the 
longstanding tradition of seafaring among Cape Verdeans, a tradition that has 
resulted in Cape Verdeans acquiring cultural elements from many parts of the 
world; and 3) the dual role that Cape Verdeans have played in African slavery, 
both as slaves themselves and as masters of slaves.lo7 
Identity and ethnicity are the most widely studied areas of the Cape Verdean 
community in the United States. Cape Verde's racial make up attracts the attention of 
many in academia, because it defies America's strictly defined racial stratum. In order to 
understand these dynamics we must first understand the historical and ethnic make up of 
Cape Verde's population. 
Until independence in 1975, Cape Verde's power was placed in the hands of the 
Portuguese and other European residents in the islands. Because they were light in 
complexion, rulers were called brancos (whites in Portuguese). Lobban reveals: 
In the fifteenth century, when the initial settlement of the islands was taking 
place, there were simply two large groups: (1) the brancos, the rulers, capitiios, 
administrators, noblemen, and top officers, settlers, and their wives and children, 
in addition to some exiled Portuguese criminals, and (2) the pretos ("blacks"), 
who initially were almost all slaves, with some exceptions for those who played 
special roles in slave raids and trade, in translating, in enforcement of the slave 
system, and in the military service.108 
10'7 David Baxter, "Approaches to Studying Ethnicity Among Cape Verdeans in New Bedford," 
Preliminary Report of'Field Work in Progress; Massachusetts Second Colloquium on Peoples of 
Portuguese Origins in North America, (Held as part of the Northeastern Anthropological Association 
Annual Meetings, Clark University, Worcester, MA, April 26-28, 1974), I .  Accessed at the Special 
Collections on Cape Verde, John P .  Adams Library, Rhode Island College 
108 Lobban, 54. 
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This system immediately changed after slave masters commenced sexual relations with 
their slaves, thus blurring this well defined racial divide. This would also cause the 
formation of the mainly crioulo or mestiqo population in Cape Verde. The following 
table displays the composition of Cape Verdean society between 1550 and 1950. After 
independence, the "race" category was dropped from Cape Verde's National Institute of 
Statistics. 
Table 6. Percentage of Racial Composition of Cape Verde 
White Mesti~o Black 
1550 1.96 69.61 28.38 
1900 3.19 62..47 34.34 
1930 3.98 59.80 36.27 
1936 3.89 75.23 20.86 
1940 3.19 62.47 34.34 
1950 2.06 69.09 28.84 
Source: Lobban (1992), 55.. 
The Portuguese did very little to preserve African culture in Cape Verde. They 
banned African cultural practices, religions, languages, and music. Slaves were often 
baptized with European names and converted to Catholicism. 
Slave records demonstrated that African ethnic features were just as important as 
physical features. Color was reported as preto (black) but as Lobban mentioned, ". . .there 
were many who are recognized as preto fula or simply fula colored, with a suggestion 
63 
that an individual had a somewhat lighter complexion typical of the interior Fula 
people."109 Additionally, in the Portuguese language color references were brown, light 
tan, and dark tan. With the emergence of the mestiqo population, this same system used 
physical attributes such as nose type (flat or very flat), hair textures, and body build to 
describe slaves. This was very different from the United States where race classifications 
were sharply divided and identifiable hint of African blood would be enough for one to 
be discriminated against. In Cape Verde as well as in Brazil, for example, racism existed 
but there were no institutionalized structures. 
Cape Verdeans served as middle men during the colonial period. They were local 
administrators in various parts of the Portuguese-speaking Africa. On the one hand, Cape 
Verdeans were exploited by Portugal but on the other, Cape Verde was better off than 
other African colonies in terms of economic development, health conditions, and 
education because they were considered an overseas province hence received limited 
privileges. However, the system of divide and conquer had lasting effects in its society. 
There were those who accepted the colonial system and did not think there was an 
alternative. Thus, Cape Verdeans were both oppressed and oppressors.'1° 
From the initial period of their arrival in the United States, during the nineteenth 
century, Cape Verdeans were faced with the harsh realities of racism in the American 
society. In the rural areas of Cape Verde where most Cape Verdeans in America came 
from, race and identity was not a concern for everyday life. In the United States, 
'09 Ibid., 55-6. 
110 Lobban, 55-60 
however, the color of a person's skin was politically and socially important. Because 
Cape Verde was part of Portugal's colonial empire, Cape Verdeans called themselves 
Portuguese. In the United States, being Portuguese meant being white. Darker skinned 
Cape Verdeans identified themselves as white Portuguese. In Cape Verde, being white 
was a social as well as a racial label. A person of color could be called white, if they 
demonstrated superior social and education skills and possessed wealth. ''I 
The white Portuguese from Azores and Madeira did not associate with Cape 
Verdeans. They considered Cape Verdeans to be Africans due to skin color as well as 
cultural differences such as language. Cape Verdeans were almost fully excluded from 
Portuguese churches, social clubs, and communities. They were not attracted to 
predominantly Protestant African American communities in New Bedford, although 
some Cape Verdeans converted to Protestantism or formed new Catholic ~hurches."~ 
Cape Verdeans quickly noticed that, in America, there was racism against anyone who 
was not white. 
Cape Verdeans were considered black not only because of the rigid racial 
structure existent in American society but also because of conventional American social 
c las~if ica t ion.~~~ The jobs they were able to obtain were similar to those of African 
Americans. However, as Machado pointed out, "By their own reckoning, Cape Verdeans 
"' Deirdre Meintel Machado, "Cape Verden Americans," in Hzdden Minorities the Persistence 
oJEthnicity in American Life ed. Joan H Rollins (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981), 
233-56. 
' I 2  Ibid ,237 
' I 3  Halter, 8-1 5 
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were "Portuguese," culturally superior to Africans and to American blacks as 
They did not want to be seen as "negro." Most Cape Verdeans sought to gain recognition 
as a separate social group than African Americans "by preference" and segregated from 
the white Portuguese by "ne~essity.""~ Similar to the Cape Verdean community, this 
phenomenon was also true of the Irish community once its members saw value in being 
considered "white" and not a "minority." Some Cape Verdeans "passed" for Latin 
Americans (Puerto Rican or Cuban) and others, who were darker, were lumped with the 
larger Black American population.116 This was true of Cape Verdeans from Fogo and 
Santiago islands, where the population was typically darker. These immigrants suffered 
discrimination from the American society as well as their fellow Cape Verdeans. 
After independence there was an increased interest in Cape Verdean culture, 
music and language, especially by younger Cape Verdean Ameri~ans."~ Once these 
cultural expressions were brought to the United States, certain versions slightly 
transformed from its original form in Cape verde.l18 Crioulo also gained social 
significance. Once considered embarrassing and a sign of illiteracy and African roots, 
Crioulo became a way for Cape Verdeans to identify themselves, create a cultural 
commonality, and distinguish themselves from African Americans. It also afforded them 
a sense of higher social status. "There was certainly some practical utility in maintaining 
~ a c h a d o  (1981), 235. 
115 Ibid., 236. 
' l6 Ibid. 
"' Ibid. 
1 1 8  Richard Lobban, "A Synthesis of Cape Verdean Culture and History," Cimboa, 5-9 
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the mother tongue, since American whites often regard foreigners of color as "not the 
same as" or "better than" American Blacks and accord them more benign 
As the civil rights movements gained momentum in the 1960s with the black 
pride and black power movements, many young Cape Verdeans joined forces and 
identified themselves as African Americans and not as white ~ o r t u ~ u e s e . ' ~ ~  They were 
often rejected by African Americans who did not accept them as black. In addition, there 
was conflict between the younger and older Cape Verdeans over racial identity, which 
continues today. 
Cape Verdeans face many questions relating to racial identity. For a people who, 
historically, were never required to place a racial label on themselves, they were faced 
with this phenomenon once they arrived in the ports of New Bedford. Cape Verdeans 
endure what Halter called the "double invisibility" of being black and foreign.12' 
Different labels emerged as Americans did no know what to call Cape Verdeans, "the 
green people," black Portuguese, and Bravas. Sometimes they were black, at other times 
they were white, but most of the time, Cape Verdeans were neither. American culture 
forces people to choose between the categories of "black" or "white." The identity 
question persists. The wide variety of recent ethnic studies on the Cape Verdean 
community and the question of its identity, demonstrate academia's interest in dealing 
with this question within the strict racial spheres of American scholarship. However, the 
119 Machado (1981), 237.. 
120 Barry Glassner, "Cape Verdeans: The People Without a Race," in Sepia, July 1975, Volume 
24, Number 11, 65-70, Cape Verde Special Collections, Rhode Island College. 
12' Halter, 14. 
racial system in the United States, especially within scholarly work, needs 
reconsideration in terms of the approach to studying black immigrant politics. It is not so 
much of a problem of Cape Verdean ethnicity but of the existing racial construct in the 
United States. As Halter pointed out: 
Perhaps because the United States has had a history of institutionalizing racism 
within such fixed genetic categories as compared to other societies, even those 
with a history of slavery such as Brazil or even the Cape Verde islands 
themselves, it has been more difficult for American historians to view race as 
anything but a physical feature. 
The discourse on race relations and immigration, for blacks in particular, has been 
narrowed to the African American experience. A recent article in USA Today speaks to 
the growing nature of the black immigrant population in the United States and diversity 
within the black community. It stated that, "The diversity is not in skin color but in 
culture, language and national origin."122 Twenty-five percent of the growth of the black 
population between 1990 and 2000 was due to African and Caribbean immigrants.123 
The black immigrant population has increased at a faster rate than the population of 
traditional African Americans. The number of African Americans increased ten percent 
to thirty-one million in the 1990s. '~~   ow ever, the number of blacks from Africa 
lZ2 Haya El Nasser, "Black American's New Diversity: Immigrants from Africa, Caribbean 




doubled to five hundred thirty-seven thousand during the same period. The Caribbean 
population also increased sixty-three percent to more than one and a half mi1li0n.l~~ 
The shift in the black population in the United States changes the nature of black 
politics and forces the black community to restructure social and political institutions, to 
include immigrant groups. Black immigrant groups are in their largest numbers in major 
U.S. cities such as Boston, Washington, DC, New York, and Atlanta. In some regions, 
black immigrant groups make up twenty percent of the population.'26 Members of such 
groups are being elected to office and representing their communities in the political 
sphere. 
Another component affecting population growth in the black community is 
conceptualizing the term, African-American. There are many people in the black 
community who consider themselves black but do not see themselves as African 
American. "Blacks from Africa and the Caribbean tend to be better educated, have 
higher income and live in more prosperous neighborhoods than ~frican-Ameri~ans."'~~ 
Black immigrants see the United States as a land of opportunities. African Americans are 
still linked to the legacy of slavery, which marked their history for centuries. However, 





Cape Verdianiq: Diaspora and Homeland Development 
What is the basis for the connection between Cape Verdeans and their homeland? 
Promoting Cape Verdean ethnic identity and culture also promotes development at home. 
That is to say, promoting Cape Verdean culture and ensuring its predominance among 
Cape Verdeans in diasporic communities will result in a stronger connection and 
relationship between Cape Verdeans abroad and their homeland. The process is mutually 
reinforced by the continued financial and political support from diasporic communities as 
well as the political and social support the diaspora receives from Cape Verde's 
government. Promoting the culture abroad also creates a distinction between the Cape 
Verdean community and other ethnic groups living within the same geographic space. 
The Cape Verdean community can then identify itself as a separate ethnic interest group. 
The unique essence of being from Cape Verde, a descendant of Cape Verdean 
immigrants, and the continued display of the cultural markers previously discussed 
constitute Cape Verdianity, Cape Verdeaness, or Creoleness and creates a need for a 
connection to the homeland; it fosters the desire to maintain a connection to what is 
familiar and what is known to be one's true cultural and ethnic identity: not quite 
European yet not quite African, but a mixture of the two. 
Laguerre explained that, "Nineteenth Century America provides us with a good 
laboratory for the observation of the diverse forms of integrating immigrants in urban 
~ m e r i c a . " ' ~ ~  He questioned the assimilationist ideology which failed because America is 
lZ8 Michel S. Laguerre, Diasporic Citizenship Haitian Americans in Transnational America 
(New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 5. 
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inherently a transnational state filled with diverse cultures. The assimilationist ideology 
predicted that all newcomers to the American society would absorb themselves into the 
American cultural and social norms thus producing a homogenous nation. However, as 
in the case of Cape Verdeans, most immigrants continued to maintain strong links to their 
countries of origin by corresponding with relatives and friends as well as by sending 
monetary and in-kind remittances and sometimes, returning to their homeland. Full 
assimilation to the American culture did not happen because of "their attachment to their 
countries of origin, their unwillingness to become completely AngloSaxonized, and their 
desire to speak their native language and establish schools, churches, and newspapers that 
maintain their cultural identities and  tradition^."'^^ 
Cape Verdianity, Cape Verdeaness, or Creoleness creates a safe social space for 
Cape Verdeans in the United States to be who they believe themselves to be and not what 
has been assigned to them by the American racial system. The notion of cultural and 
ethnic commonalities, as described by Gillis, "indicates the promotion of or adherence to 
a communal identity that is characterized by a sense of sameness over time and space."130 
This also pertains to Cape Verdeans who were born in the United States who maintain a 
symbolic relationship with their homeland. Even if they have never visited Cape Verde 
they still refer to it as their homeland. More recent Cape Verdean immigrants maintain 
more active ties with Cape Verde with frequent phone calls to relatives, and sending 
monetary remittances home. As asserted by Sanchez, "whether maintaining an active or 
lZ9 Ibid 
130 J. Gillis, "Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," in Commemorations, ed J,. 
Gillis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 994), 3-26, 
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passive connection, Cape Verdeans still conceptualize the Cape Verde Islands as a 
defining cultural symbol in their identity con~truction."'~~ 
In his work on the Haitian diaspora in New York, Laguerre uses the concept 
"dispersed nation" to define a diaspora as "individual immigrants or communities who 
live outside the legal or recognized boundaries of the state or the homeland, but inside the 
reterritorialized space of the dispersed nation."'32 Thus diasporic communities can be 
considered populations belonging to two different spaces, the homeland and host country. 
Sanchez identifies the "Cape Verdean diaspora as one of the many populations who 
acquire this type of nationalist double consciousness."'33 She further states that, "Cape 
Verdeans are at once attached to two societies. They are living and participating 
members of the U.S.. . .yet, they still reference Cape Verde as their home. The U.S., then, 
is understood as a home-away-from-home in the minds of Cape Verdean-born members 
of the d i a ~ ~ o r a . " ' ~ ~  
Laguerre also defines "diasporic nationalism" as "the public or domestic patriotic 
expression of attachment that immigrants exhibit for the homeland," in reference to 
immigrant activities in the host countries and the transnationalist relationships they 
maintain with the homeland. Cape Verdeans in southern New England display their 
diasporic nationalism or patriotism in various ways. They demonstrate their allegiance to 
Cape Verde by wearing shirts bearing the Cape Verdean flag and images of national 
1 3 1  Sanchez, 95. 
13' Laguerre, 8.. 
'33 Sanchez, 97. 
134 Ibid. 
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leaders as well as by playing Cape Verdean music in their cars loud enough for others to 
hear. 
Similar to the claridade literary movement of the 1920s in Cape Verde, the 
CrColitC movement in the French Antilles in the early 1990s, proclaimed they were 
"neither Europeans, nor Africans ...[ but] ~ r e o l e s . " ' ~ ~  CreolitC appeared as a literary 
movement in 1989 with Eloge' de la Creolite' (In Praise of Creoleness) by Martinican 
scholars, Patrick Chamoiseau, Raphael Confiant, and Jean BernabC. Noted Martinican 
writer and thinker ~douard Glissant pioneered this movement with his descriptive novels 
on the realities of creole culture in ~ a r t i n i ~ u e . ' ~ ~  
Creoliste novels dealt with Martinican society in the post-war period before the 
1970s. From these scholars' perspective, creoleness is defined as an "interactional or 
transactional aggregate of Caribbean, European, African, Asian and Levantine cultural 
elements, united on the same soil by the yoke of history."'" Their history is a braid of 
histories affected by several different kinds of languages, idioms, religions, which ended 
up on the islands. According to Jean Bernabe et. al., "Creoleness is the world diffracted 
but recomposed." Creoleness implies the recognition and acceptance of multiracialism 
and the commonalities of Creole peoples in the new worlds and Indian oceans and 
Oceania. 
135 Jean Bernabe, Patsick Charnoiseau, Raphael Confiant, Mohamed B. Taleb Khyar, "In Praise of 
Creoleness," Callaloo, 13, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 886-909. 
'36 ~douard  Glissant, Poetics ojRelation (Ann Arbor, M I :  University of Michigan Press, 1997), 
1-20 
13'7 Bernabe et. al., 891 
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According to Bernabe et. al. creole culture was created in the plantation system 
with the creole language at its core. Thus orality, for the Martinicans and Cape Verdeans 
alike was and continues to be a central point of their creoleness. It has produced songs, 
tales, proverbs, nursery rhymes which has created the people's knowledge base. 
Another distinctive point that defines creole people or any colonized peoples is 
the legacy of colonialism and its impact on defining and creating the people's history. In 
most instances, the history of the colonization process is perceived as the history of the 
people. Historians only offer accounts or responses to colonialism and omit the stories of 
resistance and spirit of local people, non-relational to the colonial experience. Thus, the 
history of colonization is wrongly recognized as the history of the people. Similar to the 
CreolitC movement in Martinique, the scholars of the Claridade movement in Cape 
Verde, used literature to convey the realities of the common people and resist the 
vanishing of Cape Verdean Creole culture. 
The CreolitC movement came about as a critical response to Negritude, a 
movement popularized by notable Martinican writer Aim6 Cesaire, encouraging blacks in 
the diaspora to rediscover and proudly accept their African roots. Negritude as an 
ideology was designed to revolutionize black literature, cure black alienation, and bring 
about political, economic, and social reform. However, Negritude was not as popular in 
the 1970s, since most African nations had already gained independence and major 
changes were already taking place on the continent. The Caribbean, however, remained a 
French colonial subject. Thus, as a movement, Negritude was not as popular in the 
Caribbean, whose people felt indifferent towards their African roots. They were 
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disenchanted with their colonial situation but did not believe Negritude was the answer 
that would bring change. These answers were oriented towards Africa and did not 
present the French Caribbean with any answers to their socio-economic and political 
realities. 
Martinican writer, Edouard Glissant recognized Negritude as a necessary 
movement for its time period given that most African nations were not independent. 
However, in the post-independence period, Glissant argued that while African writers 
should move towards discussions to reflect contemporary realities in redefining the 
African personality in the context of contemporary life, Caribbean writers should do the 
same for their own realities, but that the Caribbean constituted a different cultural zone, 
races, customs, and ways of thought which also implicated different cultures over 
centuries while celebrating this me'tissage (race mixing). Glissant suggested a move 
beyond Negritude to a more realistic goal: "One cannot take root in poetic desires, even 
desires which proclaim one's roots, nor in a distant country, even if it is the mother- 
country, Africa.. . We must move from desire to reality."138 In his work, instead of 
Negritude, Glissant suggested a different perspective where the Caribbean was the center 
and Africa was present as an "instructive actuality, a paradigm of social cooperation," 
and not as a metaphor for black beauty or vanished dignity. 
In their critique, BernabC et. al., argue that Negritude replaces one construction of 
the self, the notion that Antillean identity is essentially European with the notion that 
Antillean identity is fundamentally African. Both Eurocentric and Afrocentric images 
- 
13' Beverley Ormerod and Edouard Glissant, "'Beyond "Negritude': Some Aspects of the Work 
of Edouard Glissant," Contemporary Literature 15, no 3 (Summer 1974): 361. 
repress the mixture of creole culture, and its multiple identity. Raphael Confiant 
highlights, "our mosaic identity has nothing to do with the phantasms of purity or 
harmony entertained by the zealots of total assimilation into France, or contrarily, by the 
tenants of Negro identity, of Afrocentric ~ e g r i t u d e . " ~ ~ ~  
In critiquing CreolitC, scholars have identified it as a movement to cater to the 
foreign ideals of exoticism and stereotypical notions of island culture. Proponents of 
negritude and Cesairian thinking have also depicted it as an attack on NCgritude and a 
desire to separate the Antilles from Africa and the black race. This critique is also true 
for those who disagree with Cape Verdeans who choose to call themselves simply Cape 
Verdean and not African nor European. 
However, Creolistes argue for the positive aspects of globalization and how it 
allows CreolitC to flourish as a movement. Global migration has afforded people to move 
about with more fluidity and define themselves in diverse ethnic lights based on the 
geographical space they find themselves. It gives people more individual and cultural 
freedom. 
In her discussion of CreolitC, Francoise Lionnet provides the example of two 
sister islands in the Indian Ocean, Mauritius and Reunion, and how they have developed 
very different models of multicultural societies. While Mauritius exemplifies a great 
example of a "creole state," Reunion, on the other hand finds itself in chaos with heavy 
13' Patrick Chamoiseau, Raphael Confiant, Jean Besnabe, Lucien Taylor, "Creolite Bites," 
Transition 74 (1997): 129. 
76 
influence from its metropole, ~rance. '~ '  Mauritius has allowed minorities the rights to 
their own language, religion, and cultural practices. Tensions between the Hindus, 
Muslims, and black Creoles plagued the country following independence in 1968. Since 
then, compromise between the ethnic groups was reached and Mauritius emerged as a 
nation where cultural differences are celebrated and solidarity among these groups is 
desired for the sake of the nation's development and peacekl existence. Similar to 
Creolitd, "Mauritians do not believe there is only one true and objective answer to the 
question of identity, but rather that identity is a complex process of negotiation, 
something that all postcolonial and minority cultures are acutely aware of today."141 
Mauritius' framework on nationalism and identity is similar to Cape Verde's and 
quite different from Europe and the United States. Although Cape Verde's society is not 
comprised of different ethnic groups, it is still similar to Mauritius because of its crioulo 
heritage which has resulted in a society of diverse people, all of whom consider 
themselves Cape Verdean first, despite the vast difference in background and physical 
appearance. In the cases of Europe and the U.S., both states identify with one particular 
ethnic group. For example, second generation North African immigrants in France or 
Muslim immigrants in Britain are not seen as real French or British citizens. In the U.S., 
Asian Americans and African Americans are viewed as Asian and African first because 
they can be visibly identified as such and are different from the norm as defined by the 
140 Francoise Lionnet, "CreolitB in the Indian Ocean: Two Models of Cultural Diversity," Yale 
French Studies 82, no. 1, Post/Colonial Conditions: Exiles, Migrations, and Nomadisms (1993): 101-1 12. 
l4' Ibid, 105. 
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majority. In Mauritius, cultural diversity is celebrated and reflected in socio-economic 
and political affairs. However, the ethnic groups are considered Mauritian first. 
This introductory chapter has described the premise of the research study by 
providing an account of Cape Verde's development from Portugal's colonial subject to 
independent nation, the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States, and its arrival to the 
U.S. as well as the challenges of community and ethnic identity formation in Southern 
New England. It has identified the preservation of Cape Verdean crioulo cultural identity 
as the basis for the diaspora's commitment to homeland development is.142 Pires- 
Hester's work on the Cape Verdean diaspora discusses the prevalent notion among Cape 
Verdeans regarding the unique essence of their culture and the promotion of such in the 
host country. They deem their mixed identity as a social value and as key to the 
emergence of the Cape Verdean diaspora as a significant ethnic interest group who has 
the potential to be a principal actor in the development of the homeland and improve its 
diplomatic relationship with the United The belief that Cape Verde is still 
considered home, and that the U.S. is the home-away-from-home, remains persistent in 
the minds of many Cape Verdeans. However, as highlighted in Sanchez' study, the Cape 
Verdean diaspora remains plagued by fragmentation over identity and nationality 
issues.'44 There is a division between Cape Verdeans born in America (Cape Verdean 
Americans) and Cape Verdeans born in Cape Verde (Cape Verdean immigrants). The 
142 Laura J. Pires-Hester, "A Study of Cape Verdean American Ethnic Development: The 
Emergence of' Bilateral Diaspora Ethnicity and Its Impact in a Southeastern New England Locality," 
(Dissertation Ph .D .: Columbia University, 1994). 
143 Ibid. 
144 Sanchez, 114-125 
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ways in which they identify themselves is contingent upon their notions of nationality. 
While Cape Verdean Americans might see themselves as being Americanized, Cape 
Verdeans immigrants might define themselves based on their islands of origin. This 
dichotomous notion of identity has created a fragmented diasporic community. This 
research analysis offers further insight into the trends and attitudes of these two 
fragments of the Cape Verdean community and whether this dichotomy affects the way 
they relate to each other and their homeland. 
Limitations of the Study 
The analysis covers the period from 1945 to 2008. The timeframe was chosen to 
cover the end of World War 11, a period when many African nations were seeking or had 
already achieved independence. Cape Verde was no stranger to this movement, having 
also sought independence from Portugal. In the 1950s and 1960s, many of its citizens 
living abroad either supported or protested this struggle for independence. An analysis of 
primary and secondary sources (newspaper articles, books, and interviews with Cape 
Verdean organizations) will highlight the dynamics between those who supported the 
independence movement or supported continued colonial rule.14' 
This case study focuses on the Cape Verdean diaspora in the United States but 
does not attempt to give a detailed account of Cape Verde's history and current 
conditions. It focuses primarily on Cape Verde's diaspora resident in the United States 
'45 Secondary sources such as newspaper articles from the Standard times and the Cape Verdean 
(CVN) were collected from the New Bedford Whaling Museum in New Bedford, Mass and the Rhode 
Island College Special Collections on Cape Verde in Providence, RI. 
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and their perceptions, attitudes, and trends towards their community organizations and 
homeland. Lastly, given that a portion of the literature is in Portuguese, certain 
translations are subject to the author's interpretation. 
Organization of Study 
This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter one consists of the introduction 
and statement of the problem, research questions, hypotheses and assumptions, 
significance of the study, definition of concepts, methodological procedures limitations 
and organization of the study. Chapter two reviews the existing literature within the 
scope of the study and chapter three contains the theoretical framework. 
Chapter four highlights Cape Verde and its diasporic communities. It offers a 
general discussion on Cape Verdean communities and their organizations in Portugal, 
Holland and Argentina, and a brief overview of the largely female community in Italy. 
Chapter five will provide an analysis of the data findings on Cape Verdean communities 
in the United States. In addition to the analysis of the data collected, chapter five will 
also focus on data and survey findings which are used to generate observations, 
conclusions, and recommendations. 
CHAPTER I1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review analyzes scholarly work on diaspora politics defined as the political 
behavior of diaspora groups. The discussion considers modem diasporas in the twentieth 
century. Brief attention is given to historical roots of diasporas for contextual purposes, 
and diasporas within the global perspective. This review is an assessment of how 
diaspora groups emerge and organize to protect, promote, and advance their political, 
economic, social, and cultural interests in their host countries, homelands, and in the 
international arena. 
United States as a Melting Pot 
Immigrants and their children make up one in every four Americans. There are 
more than thirty-four million foreign-born persons in the United States, both documented 
and undocumented.' Almost eight million of these immigrants are permanent residents, 
eighteen years of age or older, with sufficient residence time (five years) to be eligible for 
' Louis De Sipio, "Transnational Politics and Civic Engagement: Do Home Country Political Ties 
Limit Latino Immigrant Pursuit of U S Civic Engagement and Citizenship?' in Transforming Politics, 
Transforming America The Political and Civic Incorporation ojImmzgrants m the United States, ed 
Taeku Lee, S. Karthick Ramakrishman, and Ricardo Ramirez (Chsu lottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
2006), 106 
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American ~itizenship.~ During the 1970s, roughly nine million were foreign-born 
 resident^.^ 
Most contemporary immigrants to the U.S. come from Afiica, Asia, the 
Caribbean, and Latin America. Until the first decade of the twentieth century, ninety 
percent of new immigrants came from Europe. Currently, Latinos make up eighty-five 
percent of new immigrants to the U.S. As a consequence, non-Hispanic white Americans 
are projected to fall below fifty percent of the U.S. adult population by 2050.~ The new 
era of immigrants has produced a significant change in the American racial and ethnic 
composition. Figure 2.1 illustrates the foreign born population in the United States by 
state of re~idence.~ 
Ibid, 
Taeku Lee, S Karthick Ramakrishnan and Ricardo Ramirez, Transforming Politics, 
Transforming Amerzca The Polltical and Civic Incorporation oflmmigrants in the United States 
(Charlottsville: University of Virginia Press, 2006), 1-10. 
Ibid 
www.census.gov (Foreign-Born Population of the United States American Community Survey, 
2003). Also see, Michael Jones-Correa, "Immigrants, Blacks, and Cities" in Black and Multiracial 
Politics in America, ed. Yvette M .  Alex-Assensoh and Lawrence J. Hanks (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000), 140. 
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Figure 2.1. Foreign-Born Population by State of Residence 
Diaspora Defined: From Ancient Greece to Modern Times 
The word diaspora comes from the Greek verb speiro (to sow) and the preposition 
dia ( ~ v e r ) . ~  The term diaspora was not used until the 1960s in the Encyclopedia of the 
Social Sciences and it was primarily applied to the Jewish exile, that is to say, to the 
Jewish communities who dispersion around the world had begun with the Babylonian 
captivity. Until 1993, Webster's dictionary defined diasgora as "the settling of scattered 
colonies of Jews outside Palestine after the Babylonian exile."' After this period, the 
definition became more inclusive of other groups and changed to "the situation of people 
living outside their traditional homeland." The Jewish and Greek communities are two of 
the world's oldest diaporas. For ancients Greeks, diaspora meant migration and 
Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8-10. 
Ibid. 
colonization. For Africans, Irish, Palestinians, and Armenians, however, its meaning is 
rather traumatic due to the harsh experiences faced by each group. In contrast, most 
modem diasporas, were not agents of colonization or victims of persecution. 
Modern diasporas are defined as, "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins 
residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material 
links with their countries of origin - their h~meland."~ An ethnic community, as 
explained by Milton J. Esman, is a group of people united by inherited culture, racial 
features, belief systems (religion) or national  sentiment^.^ Membership in an ethnic 
community is a relationship that an individual is born into. Ethnic identity is a set of 
meanings that individuals ascribe to their membership in an ethnic community, including 
attributes that bind them together as a collective and distinguish it fiom others in their 
respective environments.1° Once an individual accepts this membership he has certain 
obligations and responsibilities to the community that Esman refers to as ethnic 
solidarity. Solidarity is established and maintained by socialization reinforced by social 
controls, economic incentives, and external pressures. The population bases for the 
solidarity that is necessary for ethnic political organization are "ethnic communities 
whose cohesion and sense of continuity reflect perceptions of common peoplehood, 
Gabriel Sheffer, "A New Field of Study: Modern Diasporas in International Politics," in Modern 
Diasporas in International in International Politics, ed. Gabriel Sheffer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1986), 3. 
9 Milton J. Esman, Ethnic Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 26-27. 
lo David 0. Sears, Mingying Fu, P. J. Henry and Kerra Bui, "The Origins and Persistence of 
Ethnic Identity among the "New Immigrant" Groups," Social Psychology 66, no. 4, Special Issue: Race, 
Racism, and Discrimination (December 2003): 419-437. 
l 1  Esman, 26-27. 
84 
collective interests and destiny."12 Solidarity means commitment to defending these 
interests and maintaining boundaries. These may change overtime. The greater the 
solidarity, the more likely the emergence of ethnic political movements. 
Ethnic political movements convert an ethnic community into a political 
competitor to combat ethnic antagonists or promote interests on the agenda of the host 
country. It seeks to reflect the needs of the collective consciousness or aspirations of the 
entire ethnic community. These may be split into several different organizations. Once 
the ethnic community becomes politicized it mobilizes on behalf of its collective interests 
and aspirations. This requires political action, recruitment of individuals into 
organizations, and financial and material resources. Additionally, incentives must be 
provided for individuals to remain committed to and provide financial support to such 
organizations. Although Esman (ethnic communities), and Sheffer and Cohen (diasporas) 
define these communities with different terms similar features can be found among their 
discussion. These differences are highlighted in a later section. 
Robin Cohen draws attention to the common features of a diaspora on table 7. 
l2 Ibid, 27. 
Table 7. Common Features of a Diaspora 
1. Dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatic, to two or more foreign regions; 
2. alternatively, the expansion from homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to 
further colonial ambitions; 
3. a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, and 
achievements; 
4. an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its 
maintenance, restoration, safety, and prosperity, even it creation; 
5 .  the development of return movement that gains collective approbation; 
6. a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense 
of distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate; 
7. a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least 
or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group; 
8. a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of 
settlement; and 
9. the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a 
tolerance for pluralism. 
Source: Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1997), 26. 
There are differences in factors which cause diasporas to emerge as well as the 
degree of trauma suffered which include expulsion, coercion as well as pressures of 
overpopulation, famine, hunger, poverty, and repressive government. In addition to the 
Jewish community, the Afi-ican, Armenian, and Irish communities experienced such 
circumstances. Nearly ten million Africans were brought to the Americas to work on 
8 6 
plantations, through the slave trade. l 3  During 191 5- 16, Armenians faced forced 
displacement from much of their homeland. The Turks deported almost two million 
Armenians who ended up in Syria and Palestine (and later to the U.S. and France). In 
addition to those deported, there was a reported one million Armenians who were killed 
or died of starvation during this ethnic cleansing.14 The massive Irish migration between 
1845 and 1852, following the great famine was a direct result of laissez-faire attitude 
from the British government who were looking to push for population control, 
modernization of agricultural production, and land reform agendas.15 Other indentured 
laborers abroad include Indians, Japanese, and chinese.16 Table 9 and 10 demonstrate 
the main historical and modern diasporas. 
l3  Elliot P. Skinner, "The Dialectic Between Diasporas and Homelands," in Joseph E .  Harris, ed., 
Global Dimensions ojthe African Diaspora, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C.: Howard University Press, 1993), 
11-40. 
14 Sheffer, 31-54. 
15 Kevin Kenny, The American Irish A History, (New York: Pearson Education Inc., 2000), 89- 
130. 
16 Ronald Takar i, Strangersfiom a DzfSerent Shore A History of Asian Americans (New York: 
Penguin Books U.S.A , Inc , 1989), 3-75 
Table 8: Historical Diasporas: Diasporas Established in Antiquity or during the 
Middle Ages (Estimated Numbers in main Host Countries) 
Diaspora Numbers Main Host Countriesand Areas 
Armenian 5,500,000 Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, Germany, France, U.S., 
Canada, Australia, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, 
Central Asian States 
Chinese 35,000,000 Burma, Vietnam, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, 
Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, U.S., 
Canada, Australia, Peru, South America, Europe 
Druze 1,000,000 Syria, Lebanon, Israel 
German 2,500,000 U.S., Australia, Latin America, central and eastern Europe 
Greek 4,000,000 Albania, Cyprus, Turkey, U.S., Australia, Canada, South 
Africa, Ethiopia, Germany, Western Europe, Middle East 
GYPSY 8,000,000 U.S., Canada, former Soviet Union republics, the Balkans, 
eastern, central, and western Europe 
Indian 9,000,000 Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Nepal, Burma, Oman, Pakistant, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, 
South Africa, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Trinidad, Tobago, 
United Arab Emirates, UK, US., Yemen 
Jewish 8,000,000 U.S., Canada, South African, UK, France, Australia, former 
Soviet republics, Latin America, eastern Europe 
Source: Sheffer (2003), 104. 
Table 9. Modem Diasporas (Estimated Numbers in Main Host Countries) 
Diaspora Numbers Main Host Countries 
and Areas 
African-American 25,000,000 U.S. 
Black Atlantic 1,500,000 U. S., Canada, UK 
Hungarian 4,500,000 Czechoslovakia, Romania, U. S ., Canada, 
former Yugoslavia, former Soviet 
republics 
Iranian 3,500,000 Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, UK, Germany, U.S., Canada, 
Australia, Central America, South 
America, western Europe 
Irish 10,000,000 U.S., UK 
Italian 8,000,000 Britain, Argentina, Brazil, Germany, U. S ., 
France, Australia, western Europe 
Japanese 3,000,000 U.S., Hawaii, Brazil, Peru, Canada 
Kurdish 14,000,000 Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, Germany, 
France, other western European countries 
Lebanese 2,500,000 Egypt, Syria, Persian Gulf states, 
(Christian) Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, U.S., 
Australia, Canada, France, western Africa 
Polish 4,500,000 U. S ., Canada, western Europe, former 
Soviet republics 
Turkish 3,500,000 Germany, Bulgaria, Holland, Cyprus, 
Greece, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, U. S ., 
Austria 
Source: Sheffer (2003), 105. 
Classifying Diasporas 
In his discussion on diasporas in international relations, Milton J. Esman draws 
from John Armstrong distinguishing between proletariat and mobilized diasporas.I7 He 
argues that proletarian diasporas have no economic resources, few communication skills 
and limited organizational experiences. They are incapable of articulating their group's 
interests and have little to no access to power decision making circles. They are normally 
at the bottom of the income, occupational, and status ladders. Gradually they become 
proficient in local languages and obtain better jobs, more education, and advance their 
agenda within the public sphere. Esman makes the argument that diasporas take time to 
create in that, "The majority of migrant communities begin as proletarian diasporas. 
Before they develop the skills, capabilities and access needed to promote their domestic 
or international group interests, at least one or perhaps generations may be required."'* 
Mobilized diasporas however, bring occupational or communications skills that 
are in short supply in the host country. These skills are valuable to the local elite. The 
mobilized diaspora also gains access to public spheres and is able to push for the interests 
of its community by gaining the protection and trust of the "native elite."19 As explained 
by Esman, eventually the native elite loses trust on the foreigner, and as the indigenous 
population gain the same skills and knowledge, the foreigner is no longer needed as an 
intricate part of this elite sphere. 
l7 Milton J Esman, "Diasporas and International Relations," in Modern Diasporas m 
International in International Politics ed. Gabriel Sheffer (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), 336. 
l 8  Ibid. 
l9 John Armostrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," American Political Science Review 
70, no. 2 (June 1976): 393-408. 
In a later discussion on ethnic politics, Esman refines his classification of 
diasporas into three categories 1. settlers; 2. bourgeois; and 3. labor.20 He defines settlers 
such as the Norman invaders of Britain who arrived in large numbers and with superior 
military and technological strength, expelled or exterminated the inhabitants, and took 
possession of the territory. Bourgeois diaspora are immigrant communities that move to 
host country with education and economic skills, equal to or the same as the indigenous 
population. Lastly, the most common type of all is the labor diaspora, arriving as a result 
of large-scale migration from poor and overpopulated labor-surplus countries. 
Labor diasporas as political actors are driven by two complimentary forces: 1. 
compelling need for unskilled labor to first world industrial and post-industrial 
economies and 2. desperate search for livelihoods in labor surplus third world countries.21 
Esman highlights: 
These simultaneous push and push forces have been strengthened by low fertility 
rates in the industrialized countries and the unprecedentedly high rates of 
population growth in the third world. So imperative are these demand and supply 
relationships and so persistent and resourceful the migrants that the resultant labor 
flows, legal where possible, illegal where necessary, thwart the enforcement of 
immigration controls.22 
Labor migrations are not random. They are patterned by familiar channels traceable to 
earlier links, established networks, and geographical convenience. Prospective migrants 
are attracted to locations where they can expect social support from earlier arrivals and 
20 Esman (1994), 8. 
2 1  Ibid, 178 
22 Ibid. 
job opportunities. These arrangements are facilitated by factors such as services to send 
remittance of funds to families in the homeland, two-way shipping of goods, 
arrangements of travel back and forth, and importation of foodstuffs. This can be said of 
such groups as the Mexicans in the United States, and North Africans in ~ rance .~"  
In contrast to Armstrong and Esman, Gabriel Sheffer offers a different 
classification of diasporas. The distinction, he argues, is between stateless diasporas and 
state-linked diasporas. A stateless diaspora is dispersed segments of nations that have 
been unable to establish any independent state. State-linked diasporas are in host 
countries and are connected to societies of their own ethnic origin that constitute a 
majority in established states such as the case of the black diaspora in Europe and the 
United States. They cannot define where home is and do not have the wish or access to 
resources to establish a state. Sheffer argues that there is no direct correlation between a 
diaspora's link to an established national state (nor a diaspora's statelessness) and the 
social and economic status and organization of most members of that diaspora. 
Members of both stateless diasporas and state-linked diasporas can be 
"proletarian" (i.e., from poorer segments of their homeland societies, such as the 
Pakistanis, Indians, and Moroccans, in the United Kingdom, most Palestinians in 
the United States and Kuwait, both Christian and Muslim Lebanese who have 
recently migrated to the United States, and the Latin Americans in the United 
States) or "capitalists" (middle-class migrants and richer migrants, such as the 
recent emigrants from Hong Kong to Canada and the United States, white South 
Africans who have migrated primarily to Anglo-Saxon countries such as Australia, 
and Israeli Jews who permanently reside in various host countries. In the same 
vein, some of those groups are unorganized (as is the case of the white South 
Africans), some are loosely organized (such as the Palestinians in the United 
States and Canada), and some are well organized (such as the Colombians in the 
United States and ~ s r a e l ) . ~ ~  
23 Ibid. 
Modern diasporas are organized and develop multilateral connections with 
various political and social groups in the host countries, homelands, and third countries. 
They exchange information and resources with international organizations, government, 
and other relevant groups within the state which serve their base and homeland. Modern 
diasporas are showing great deal of interests in organizing for the survival of their culture. 
Their activities tend to influence politics at a trans-state level, in their host country, 
homeland and third countries. By creating trans-state networks, diasporas are protecting, 
promoting, and maintaining their interests. Gabriel Sheffer sums up diasporas: 
In their host countries diasporas preserve their ethnic, or ethnic-religious identity 
and communal solidarity. This solidarity serves as the basis for maintaining and 
promoting constant contacts among the diasporas' activist elements. These 
contacts have political, economic, social and cultural significance for the 
diasporas, their host countries, and homelands. One of the purposes of these 
actions is to create and increase the readiness and ability of the diasporas to 
preserve a continuous interest in, and cultural, economic and political exchanges 
with their homelands ... and most importantly, the capability of diaporas to 
mobilize in order to promote or defend their interests or the interests of their 
homelands within their host countries will result in the formation of either 
conflictual or cooperative triadic networks involving homeland, diaspora and host 
country.25 
One of the fundamental concerns with this operational definition is its application 
to certain cases. In some cases, the homeland and the diaspora are not clearly defined. 
Sheffer provides the example of the Jewish and the African diasporas. In the case of the 
Jewish diaspora there is no consensus within the community as to whether Israel is 
24 Sheffer, 148. 
25 Sheffer (1986), 9-10 
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indeed the center of the community.26 Another example is the African-American 
community in the United States and its relationship with the African continent. It is not 
clear whether the whole continent is considered the homeland or if only certain countries 
are considered as In addition, Sheffer points out the complex nature of this 
relationship and adds, "whether Blacks in the U.S. can be regarded as a diaspora since 
their ties with the "homeland" are only a vague concept among certain limited segments 
of the Black elite in the U.S. The majority feel that they are not of a diaspora and that 
their homeland is definitely the u.s."~' 
Locksley Edmonson, himself part of the Jamaican diapora, offers a 
comprehensive discussion on African Americans and the emergence of coalition building 
and support for the African continent. He highlights, "the extent to which Black 
Americans historically "rejected" identification with Africa has long been subject to 
debate, with profound variations on the acceptance/rejection theme influenced by time, 
place and  circumstance^."^^ 
Another aspect of the above mentioned definition is the relationship between the 
homeland and its diaspora. It assumes that the homeland is supportive of its diaspora and 
there is a level of reciprocity between the two entities. The diaspora may maintain ties 
26 Howard M. Sachar, A History ofthe Jews in the Modern World (New York: Alfsed A. Knopf, 
2005), 3-17. 
=" Skinner, 2 1. 
28 Sheffer, 1 1 . 
29 Locksley Edmondson, "Black America As a Mobilizing Diasporas: Some International 
Implications," in Modern Diasporas in International Politics ed. Gabriel Sheffer (New York: St. Martin's 
Press), 165. 
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with the homeland but the homeland's attitude toward the diaspora may not be clear. In 
addition, the diaspora may be actively opposed to the homeland's government, such as 
the case of Cuba and its diaspora in the United States. 
Profile of Modern Diasporas: Reasons for Solidarity and Organization 
Current notions of the historical roots of ethnic diasporas tend to link them to 
expulsion or exile. Often migration happens voluntarily, caused by a group's desire to 
find better conditions elsewhere. There are push and pull factors for voluntary migrations. 
At times political and economic conditions are appealing and pull diaspora groups 
towards particular host countries (pull factors). On the other hand, diasporas can also be 
driven out of their homeland by harsh social, economic, and political conditions. 
Economic situations caused by drought and famine can push diasporas towards migration. 
Once in a host country, diasporas feel a need to organize and protect themselves 
from hostility by maintaining their unique cultural identity, ensure continuity, and 
constant contact with their homeland. Patterns of organization and political behavior 
only occur after migrants have permanently settled in a host country. However, the fate 
of migrants after arriving in a host country depends on their choices to acculturate, 
assimilate or resist assimilation. 
Both earlier and modern diasporas have demonstrated similar features: frequent 
contact (i.e. communication, visits, permanent return) and virtual links (i.e. sentiment, 
emotional attachment) to ancestral homelands (Esman, 1994), (Sheffer, 2003), (Cohen, 
1997). Symbols, legends and myths, oral narratives, remain vivid for centuries and are 
significant features in maintaining a solid and long lasting diaspora. For some, the 
homeland is a cherished and imagined place. Dreams of a permanent returning most 
often, never happen. However, for some, these memories are enough motivation to 
actively organize on behalf of the diaspora and the homeland. 
Esman argues that ethnicity cannot be politicized unless a core of memories, 
experiences, or meanings move people to collective actions. For example, struggles 
against outsiders for possession of homeland, and cultural markers (language, religion, 
and legal institutions) that set the community apart from others all help to mobilize and 
politicize ethnic communities. Esman opines, 
Ethnicity is thus shaped by environment, by the threats and the opportunities it 
affords. Seldom is ethnicity invented or constructed from whole cloth: a cultural 
and experiential core must validate identity and make solidarity credible to 
potential constituents. Yet problems posed by the external environment are as 
likely as the historical experiences and collective aspirations of the group to 
determine its dynamics.30 
Historical myths can be shaped from imagined pasts to legitimate current goals. Ethnic 
collectivity and solidarity can be located on a spectrum between historical continuities 
and opportunistic adaptations.31 
Diasporas' behavior is not contingent upon their economic status (rich or poor) 
when they arrive in the host country. Gabriel Sheffer argues that rich and poor migrants 
deal with similar issues.32 Migrants only make decisions once they arrive and assess the 
30 Esman (1994), 14. 
3 1  Ibid. 
32 Sheffer (2003), 76. 
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political and economic conditions of the host country. Sometimes migrants will move 
from their homeland to a host country and then on to a second or third host country due to 
economic, political, and social difficulties in the first host country. Only when they reach 
a host country with appealing conditions will they consider assimilation, acculturation, 
and diasporic organizations. Two important features of modern diasporas are the ability 
of migrants to maintain identity in a host country and openly nurture its community as 
well as support the homeland. Only when they are settled will they seriously consider 
decisions such as assimilation, acculturation, and resistance to assimilation. Once this 
initial phase of development is reached, then they begin to deal with issues related to 
interaction with the prevalent culture, find jobs, rent or buy homes, establish relationships 
and create support systems. The individual and collective decisions to maintain an ethnic 
identity is not enough to develop, revive, or maintain diasporas. They must be 
supplemented by action to join organizations or establish them when they do not exist. 
Memories of leaving the homeland, initial hardship in the host country, making 
the decisions to settle there and efforts to establish communal organizations, all promote 
solidarity among members of ethnic groups. Solidarity is not only based on ties to the 
homeland but to the conditions of the diaspora in host country. Solidarity and sense of 
identity provide motivations to promote and maintain contacts among diaspora activists. 
These relationships are important for the diaspora, host country, homeland and other 
actors. This is the foundation on which diasporas organize and implement strategies to 
promote collective interests. 
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Diaspora organizations function at different levels: local diaspora communities, 
host country's societies and governments and trans-state a~ t iv i t i es .~~  They also exist to 
sustain the diaspora communities themselves as well as to offer essential support to the 
homeland. The exchange between diaspora and homeland is done by trans-state 
networks. Some serve peaceful and legal functions but others utilize these networks as a 
resource to promote illegal activities such as international terrorism, by supplying 
weapons and financial resources.34 ~echnolo~ical  dvances make these activities so 
much easier with facilitating direct personal communication, and money transfers. 
Diasporas become predisposed to conflict and tension with host country, homeland, and 
international actors. 
Irish communities, in America have supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
for many years, and Jewish organizations were reported to have transferred over four 
hundred million dollars to Israel during the 1980s .~~  The Lebanese diaspora which 
includes a population of four million, have played a role in the homeland's civil war and 
sent remittances of two hundred and fifty billion dollars in 1980. Hamas has been 
identified as a terrorist organization by the U.S. since 1995 government, and has received 
continued financial support from the international community in excess of one hundred 
million dollars per year flowing via the Arab states, the British Muslims, and the United 
States. The African diaspora is no stranger to involvement in these networks and armed 
33 Sheffer (2003), 173. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, "The Dark Side of Diaspora Networking, Organized Crime, 
and Terrorism," in Diasporas, Remittances, and Africa South of the Sahara: A Strategic Assessment. 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No112/Chap3 .htm; accessed December 7,2008. 
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struggles. The Eritrean embassies in the West summoned the support of its diaspora in 
the armed struggle against Ethiopia. In addition, the African continent has been 
consistently used as route for the transfer of money by many guerrilla movements. 
Diasporas and their organizations are beneficial because they contribute to the 
culture and economy of host country. They create positive bridges between segments of 
host country and at the international level. Exchange between networks can bring 
economic, political, and cultural benefits to all involved. 
Functions of Diaspora Organizations 
Diaporas function at five levels of politics: 1. domestic level in host countries; 2. 
regional level; 3. Trans-state level; 4. level of entire diaspora; and 5. homeland politics. 
On each level, the functions fall into three broad categories: 1. maintenance; 3. Defense; 
and 2. promotion of its communities' multifaceted i n t e r e~ t s .~~  
At the host country level, communal organizations deal with issues pertaining to 
internal affairs and relations with host countries' political and social institutions. At the 
regional level, organizations are involved in economic matters and broader political arena. 
Lastly, at the global level, diaspora organizations interact with global organizations such 
as the United Nations. Maintenance functions include fundraising, routine administration 
of cultural, economic and social functions, which may include schools and community 
centers, and oversee religious institutions (i.e. mosques, churches, and theological 
schools). Other functions may include supervision of universities and research 
36 Sheffer, 173- 175 
institutions. Long standing and well established diasporas such as the Greek and Jewish 
communities in the United States, may support health and welfare services in their 
communities (i.e. hospitals, clinics, senior citizen's home). Defense is offered through 
organizations that provide physical protection for diaspora members when necessary. 
South Korean, Chinese, and Jewish communities in the United States have established 
self-defense organizations.37 
Promotional and advocacy functions are extremely significant to the emergence 
and survival of the diaspora organization. They fall into three categories: cultural, 
political, and economic. These include recruiting new members, persuading them to 
become new and active members, activities that are intended to increase ethnic awareness 
and sense of identity among diasporans (i.e. coordinate ethnic festivals, exhibitions, 
lectures, and operate via media outlets). 
Advocacy work is also very important to the continued success of diaspora 
organizations. Providing generous economic aid and investments to their homeland, 
promoting cooperation between host country and homeland are key activities. The 
United States is arguably the last remaining super power in the world and it is considered 
one of the main financiers of states in need.38 Intensive lobbying and persuasion in the 
United States Congress and White House in regards to economic issues that affect 
homelands is profitable activity for diasporas. Not only can organizations gain U.S. 
support but that of the G8, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), due to U.S. 
influence in world politics and in these spheres. In post World War I1 periods, the Greek, 
3'7 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 175. 
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Polish, and Irish diasporas in the United States succeeded in obtaining economic aid for 
their horn el and^.^^ Diasporas can also influence host countries and their policy makers to 
agree on moratoriums on loans for homelands (such as the case of Mexicans in the 
United States). Lastly, diasporas can lobby to end economic boycotts as the case of the 
Jewish community's pressure on the U.S. to end economic boycott on apartheid South 
Africa. This resulted in tensions between the Jewish and African American communities. 
The objective is to increase diaspora membership, advance diaspora communities' 
visibility and stature in host country, and consolidate contacts with homeland. 
Extra communal levels maintenance activities include remittances, personal and 
collective donations, and other kinds of economic and financial resources as well as 
supply of other political and social services to homelands. Additionally, diasporas 
organize campaigns to engender favorable attitudes towards homeland and other parts of 
their diasporas. Diaspora leaders tend to cooperate with leaders from other diaspora 
communities in organizing demonstrations for attainment of individual and collective 
political rights. 
The richer the community the more comprehensive its organizations become. 
Being well established does not only mean availability of resources. It gains access to 
power spheres in host countries. However, affluence is not an absolute requirement for 
successful organizations. Determination, experience, enthusiasm, and hard work on the 
part of the leaders and members of the diaspora are also key components. Lastly, new 
39 Ibid. 
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ethnic groups do not need to reinvent ways of entering mainstream politics. Less visible 
minorities should learn from more visible min~rities.~' 
Diasporas and Political Transnationalism 
In the last two decades the world has witnessed new forms of immigrants' 
involvement with politics in the homeland. There new and extending notions of 
citizenship while the homeland asks for the support of the diaspora. Consulates have 
become important intermediaries between the homeland and communities abroad. There 
are increased activities of homeland political parties in the diaspora's host country. On 
the other hand, diaspora organizations; are making demands of political participation and 
rights (i.e. voting, political representation, dual citizenship) in homeland's affairs. 
The rise in diaspora social networks and organizations has changed the nature of 
politics both at home and abroad. In his comprehensive work on U.S. immigrants from 
El Salvador, Haiti, and Dominican Republic, Jose Itzigsohn defines the immigrant's 
political transnational field as, "a realm of recurrent and institutionalized interactions and 
exchanges between, on the one hand, immigrants and their social and political 
organizations and, on the other hand, the political institutions and the state apparatus of 
the country of origin.'*' Itzigsohn highlights these three small nations and the impact 
their immigrant population has had on politics of their receiving and sending countries. 
40 Wilbur C. Rich, ed., The Politics oJ Minority Coalitions Race, Ethnicity, and Shared 
Uncertainties (1 996), 8. 
4 1 Jose Itzigsohn, "Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of 
Immigrants' Political Transnationalism," International Migration Review 34, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 1126- 
1154. 
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Itzigsohn's case studies on these three developing states shed significant light on 
those in the periphery of the world market economy and the broader discussion of 
diaspora politics and transnational practices. He argues that diasporas from these 
countries have changed the nature of immigrant participation in homeland politics, 
democratization processes, and diplomatic relationships with the United States. Itzigsohn 
also concludes that the unstable economic and political conditions in which Latin 
America and the Caribbean find themselves, allow for the continued pattern of 
transnational politics. 42 Additionally, this pattern of transnationalism allows these 
countries to be incorporated into the world economy, to the development of competitive 
party politics, and to the persistence of immigrant organizations in the host countries. 
In the case of Haiti, for example, the government has implemented an overseas 
department which includes the immigrant population.43 The Dominican Republic has 
created legislation where political rights will be extended to the migrants abroad. 
However, these rights have not yet been implemented. For El Salvador, migrants' 
political rights are still a futuristic vision. Nevertheless, organizations have supported the 
democratization and development processes.44 For all three countries, the process of 
transnationalization of immigrants' political rights and citizenship is still in its beginning 
stages. 
42 Ibid, 1147. 
43 M. S. Laguesre, "State, Diaspora, and Transnational Politics: Haiti Reconceptualized," 
Millenium Journal oJ'Internationa1 Studies 28, no. 3: 633-651. 
44 Itzigsohn, 1 150 
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Similar to Haiti, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, Cape Verde depends on 
remittances from its diaspora. Cape Verde's democratization process during the 1990s 
encouraged the inclusion of its diaspora in homeland politics and development by 
opening up seats in the parliament for diaspora representation from communities in 
Europe, United States, and Africa. 
In his work on the political value of remittances Montclos argues that the political 
impact of remittances is dependent on homeland state structure as well as the domestic 
economy.45 He adds that the size of the migrant community is not enough to guarantee 
their political weight. Montclos uses the case of Nigeria, who has the biggest African 
diaspora but yet do not have much influence on local or national politics. In addition to 
undemocratic state structures, Montclos offers Comores, Lesotho, and Cape Verde as 
comparative case studies. He points to fragmentation in diasporic organizations within 
the Comores and Lesotho migrant communities as the additional leading cause of their 
diasporas' low political influence on homeland politics. 
The Modern African Diaspora in the United States 
The growth of the African population in the Americas decreased with the 
abolition of slavery and was legally restricted to only European countries for most of the 
nineteenth century. Records show between 1820 and 184 1, there were seventy-one 
immigrants from Africa to the United States. Between 1841 and 1960, forty-seven 
45 Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, "The Political Value of'Remittances: Cape Verde, 
Comores, and Lesotho" at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/Nol12/Chap3.htm; accessed December 6 ,  
2008. 
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thousand Africans immigrated to the United Due to strict immigration laws, it 
was difficult to obtain immigrant visas. From 1982 to 1992, the number of African 
immigrants escalated to roughly two hundred thousand. Additionally, one hundred 
eighty-five thousand were admitted as legal immigrants. Since the 1970s, however, the 
United States and Canada has become major destinations for African immigrants. 
Currently, the African immigrant population represents two to three percent, about five 
hundred thousand in the United Considering the U.S. population is over three 
hundred million, this figure might not be accurate because it might not include the 
undocumented African population in the U. S. 
Africans did not begin migrating in huge numbers until the 1970s when persistent 
economic problems exploded in the African continent. Declining food availability, 
negative growth of national income, rising unemployment, increased debt, high rates of 
inflation, among other issues, all accounted for factors pushing Africans to migrate.48 
There were increases in prices of manufactured goods that Africa did not produce but 
consumed. Inversely, prices of goods produced but not consumed by the continent were 
on the rise. The price of cocoa, coffee, and mineral resources, representing the core of 
Africa's export, drastically dropped.4g 
46 Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang and Baffour K.. Takyi, "An Overview of African Immigration to 
the United States and Canada," in The New A$-ican Diaspora in North America. Trends, Community 
Building and Adaptation ed. Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, Baffour K Takyi and John A. Arthur (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 3 .  
48 Baffour K Takyi and Kwadwo Konado-Agyemang, "Theoretical Perspectives on African 
Migration," in in The New Afiican Diaspora in North America. Trends, Community Building and 
Adaptation ed. Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, Baffour K Takyi and John A. Arthur (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 15.. 
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During the 1980s Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS), intended to improve 
the economy of its implementing countries by devaluating the currency, cutting back on 
government spending on social services such as healthcare and education, resulted in 
impoverishing more people whose living conditions ~orsened .~ '  In addition, drought and 
famine also plagued many African nations as they sought to move forward in post 
independent times. 
Europe has been the primary destination for Africans. Africans began traveling 
voluntarily to the metropoles towards the end of World War 11. However, Europe and its 
changing immigration policies are closing its doors to Africans. Tighter laws of 
citizenship discourage immigration. The United Kingdom is the host country of many a 
large numbers of Zimbabweans, Kenyans, Nigerians. France hosts immigrants from 
Senegal, Cote D'Ivoire, Algeria, Morocco, and other Francophone countries. In contrast, 
African immigration to the United States has increased due to the diversity visa 
program. 5 1 
The notion of a "return" to the homeland is a focal issue within the diaspora 
framework. In their discussion, Mohan and Zack-Williams highlight the complex 
implications of the diaspora and a return to the African continent. The establishment of 
49 Kofi K. Apraku, AfFican Emigrks in the United States A Musing Link in African S Social and 
Economic Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 199 I), Introduction. 
50 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents (New York: W .  W .  Norton & Company, 
2002), 23-52. 
5 1  See for example, Arun Peter Lobo, "Unintended Consequences: Liberalized U,.S.. Immigration 
Law and the African Brain Drain," in in The New AfFican Diaspora in North America Trends, Community 
Building andAdaptation ed. Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, Baffour K Takyi and John A.  Arthur (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 189. 
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the settlements of Sierra Leone and Liberia had the primary objective of creating a 
"home" where Africans could return. In addition, other return movements included 
efforts by Marcus Garvey and Pan-Africanist W.E.B. Dubois are also highlighted. 
However, Mohan et. al. point out the multifaceted notion of a return and what it means to 
different people. "Different individuals and groups have different relations to "home" 
and return. Again, some see Africa in idealistic terms as a pristine haven or, according to 
the Afrocentrists, it was until white people came and despoiled it."52 Others see the 
continent as a historical place that continues to change with time. There are cultural, 
religious, and physical differences that debunk the homogenous notion of a unified 
"Africa" as a place where all Africans in the diaspora can call home.53 For some, to have 
a long lasting and stagnant vision of a place to return is not only nayve but also unrealistic. 
Although the idea of returning to the homeland on a permanent basis is far fetched 
for some, those who do return bring financial, human and social capital, which can 
contribute to the development of the national or local economies. However, those who 
do return are part of the exception and not necessarily the rule. Attention to diasporas 
and returnees scholarship has focused on the notion of a return and its positive aspects.54 
However, there is limited analysis on returnees who do so as a result of deportation. 
Deportation often occurs as a result of the returnees' illegal status in the host country, 
and/or criminal activities. While the host country is rid of a criminal, this creates a 
52 Mohan Giles and A.. B. Zack-Williams, "Globalisation from Below: Conceptualising the role of 
the African Diasporas in African's development," Review ojAj?ican Political Economy 29 (1992): 21 1-236. 
53 Kwame Appiah, In My Father's House African in the Philosophy ojCulture (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992). 
54 Mohan and Zack-Williams 
107 
problem for the homeland in terms of repatriation and rehabilitating the returnees as 
productive members of society. 
Most members of the African diaspora have the capacity of becoming central 
players in the political processes of their homeland. Some engage in organizational 
networking or specific political activities related to the homeland. Mohan et. al. highlight 
the efforts of Ghanaian and Nigerian diaspora organizations in Atlanta, political 
campaigns against the rule of Jerry Rawlings and Mugabe, and the setting up of the 
University of Hargeisa in Somaliland as a result of diaspora support, as key examples of 
how African diasporas can work from abroad to create political and social change at 
home.55 However, as mentioned in the earlier discussion of diasporas, the extent to 
which they organize is determined by the degree to which they are integrated in the host 
country. Lacking the right to work due to illegal status means that an individual is less 
likely to support the homeland in financial terms. Others might feel afraid to be involved 
in nationalist discourses due to their illegal status in the host country. 
Diasporas' financial support of their relatives at home and homeland in general, is 
of major significance to the scholarship on this topic. Although the vast scholarship on 
migration and development has focused on the impact of remittances on the homeland, 
the exact numbers are difficult to calculate. Remittances most often, go through informal 
channels, while only fifty percent are formally recorded.56 In the United States for 
example, Ghanaians remitted approximately between two hundred and three hundred and 
55 Ibid, 230-231. 
56 African Foundation for Development, AFFORD, "Globalisation and Development: a Diaspora 
Dimension," Submission by DFID, AFFORD, London, 2000 
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fifty million dollars per year during the 1990s .~~  The sending and receiving of moneys 
between Africa and the United States has been facilitated by sophisticated technology. 
Money transfer companies (i.e. Western Union and Money Gram) have increased their 
marketability and services to appeal to African communities. 
Scholarship on the role of the African diaspora in the continent's development has 
been limited. Research has focused on the cultural and social aspects of the diaspora and 
its impact on the host country, without any comprehensive analysis on how the diaspora 
can contribute to their homeland's development. Scholarship must begin to look at the 
African diaspora not as a cultural phenomenon but as a crucial component to African 
development. African intellectuals and academics have been intimidated and victimized 
by governments who will not allow them to offer honest academic critique on the state of 
Africa's development. Thus, many choose to accept jobs outside of their homeland. 
The African Brain Drain Dilemma 
Conditions in Africa force its nationals abroad in search of better living conditions. 
Citizens from Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Senegal, Cameroon, Ghana 
among other African countries can be found all over the world. Those who are not well- 
educated get educated and acquire the necessary skills to contribute to the societies where 
they live. Africa spends four billion dollars annually in training one hundred thousand 
skilled expatriates while her own professionals are abroad contributing to the 
57 E.. Akyeampong, "Afiicans in the Diaspora: The Diaspora and Africa," AJFican Affairs 99 
(2000): 183-215. 
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development of other societies, not Africa. Between 1960 and 1975, twenty-seven 
thousand highly qualified Africans left the continent for Western societies. Africa lost 
six hundred thousand professionals between 1985 and 1990, and has been losing about 
twenty thousand annually since then.j8 This flight of human capital from the African 
continent is known as brain drain. This is defined as: 
The loss, indeed an exodus of highly trained and often experienced individuals 
from their country to other nations in pursuit of higher paying jobs, as well as, 
more conducive working environments within which to express and utilize their 
hard-learned specialized talents and skills.j9 
The brain drain conditions are then created in the country the individuals leave. 
Migration is detrimental to the country of origin because the labor force is reduced by the 
departure of its most qualified manpower. There is however, brain gain for the country 
that receives them. 
The effects of the brain drain on the African continent are tremendous. Twenty 
thousand doctors, university professors, engineers, and other professionals have left the 
continent on an annual basis since 1990.~' There are three hundred thousand qualified 
Africans in the diaspora. Thirty thousand are reported to have Ph.D. degrees. Africa 
spends four billion dollars (thirty-five percent of its official development aid to the 
58 Godwin S. M Okeke, "The Uprooted Emigrant: the Impact of Brain Drain, Brain Grain, and 
Brain Circulation on Africa's Development," in Trans-Atlantic Migratzon the Paradoxes of Exile ed. 
Toyin Falola and Niyi Afolabi (New York: Routledge, 2008), 119 
60 Ibid, 129. 
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continent) for one hundred thousand western experts in technical assistance jobs. The 
human capital loss is most felt in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and ~ h a n a . ~ l  
There are one hundred Ethiopian economists in the United States, in contrast to 
one in ~ t h i o ~ i a . ~ ~  Between 1986 and 1990, Nigeria lost ten thousand academics for 
tertiary education. Sixty-four percent of Nigerians in the United States over twenty-five 
years old hold a bachelor's degree. 
The health care sector is one of the areas mostly affected by the African brain 
drain. Kenya, for example, looses twenty doctors per month.63 Ghana lost sixty percent 
of its doctors in the 1980s. There are reportedly six to seven hundred practicing 
Ghanaian physicians in the United States. In 1993, there were twenty-one Nigerian 
doctors in the U.S., while Nigeria experienced shortages. The diasporic figure has been 
estimated at thirty thousand African doctors in Saudi Arabia, Australia, Europe, and 
Canada. Although the effects of the brain drain are negative on the homeland, there are 
scholars who claim to the positive impact of remittances made by African professionals 
in the diaspora. Africans in the diaspora reportedly send home forty-five billion dollars 
per year. 64 
These however, do not make up for the social costs on developing economies. It 
encourages further reduction of already low quality of skilled manpower available in the 
African countries needed for development. Additionally, it increases the dependency on 
61 Apraku, 50 
62 Okeke, 130. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Apraku, 50. 
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foreign technical assistance. It also encourages the steady slow down of transfer of 
technology widening the gap between Africa and the industrialized countries. Lastly, 
there is a loss of money in income tax revenues as a result of brain drain which could 
count towards and contribute to the gross domestic product (GDP) of many African 
countries. Ultimately, remittances produce rich families and poor government 
institutions. The loss of human capital also known as brain drain worsens the continent's 
chances for development. 
African governments are creating programs to incorporate diaspora communities 
in nation building in their countries of origin. Some offer programs for diasporas to 
virtually participate, without having to be physically present. The African Union (AU), 
has recognized the importance of diaspora communities in the development agenda of the 
continent. It has updated in charter to, "encourage the full participation of the African 
diaspora as an important part of the ~ont inent ."~~ Okeke concludes there is correlation 
between development and migration. He opines that the relationship between African 
governments and its diaspora must change. Diasporas will not show interest in returning 
or remain active contributors to development at home if socio-economic and political 
conditions do not improve. Among other issues, good governance, greater transparency, 
effective public sector management, increased government response to the poor and other 
citizens' concerns, human rights violation, gender and social representation, and no 
tolerance for corruption must all happen for this relationship to progress. 
65 Okeke, 131-32 
Africans and African Americans: Politics of Cooperation or Conflict? 
The migration of Africans to America has facilitated conflict between Africans 
and African Americans. Current literature on the African diaspora in the United States 
assumes a homogenous culture with no major ideological differences. 
Recent immigrants from African and the Caribbean are more likely to support 
liberal immigration policies and to disapprove of anti-immigration legislation like 
Preposition 187 (anti-immigration law in California, denying welfare and other rights to 
both legal and illegal Akwasi Assensoh argues that "lower income, native 
Blacks often perceive immigrants as fierce competitors for low-skilled jobs and adequate 
housing."67 In inner city communities there is a preference for Mexican, Asian, and 
African labor rather than African-American labor. 
Another issue is the level of political competition between naturalized Caribbean 
and African immigrants with indigenous African Americans for electoral positions. For 
example, in 1995, Ghanaian-born Loyola student and naturalized resident of New 
Orleans, Joe Aidoo, campaigned and almost won against a long-term African American 
state legislator in Louisiana. In New York, there have also been local elections where 
African and Caribbean-born blacks have competed against African Americans. 
Competition within the black political elite is not a new or strange phenomenon. 
66 Akwasi B. Assensoh, "Conflict or Cooperation? Africans and African Americans in Multiracial 
America," in Black and Multiracial Politics in America ed. Yvette M .  Alex-Assensoh and Lawrence J. 
Hanks (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 113-130. 
67 Ibid, 125. 
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However, it does make matters more complex. It creates a divide in policy issues within 
the black agenda. 
Lastly, there is a new wave of African Americans interested in business ventures 
in the African continent. Hundreds and maybe thousands of African Americans travel to 
countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa with hopes of making millions with 
innovative entrepreneurial ideas. For some there is a sense of Black solidarity, that 
African Americans have an interest in the African continent and its development. For 
others in South Africa, for example, "they fear the African Americans are coming to take 
jobs from local professionals. That is a widespread view."69 The question remains if 
African Americans have a sincere motive to support African development or if the 
sentiments are strictly for money-making and business purposes. 
Diasporas and Globalization 
Elements of globalization facilitate the flow of international migration. 
Inexpensive means of transportation, technological advances that facilitate 
communication and disparity in global wealth are all incentives for international 
migration and global movement. According to Chris Rudolph, international migration in 
number is increasing rapidly in contrast to the eighteenth and nineteenth century waves of 
migration. At the turn of the century, 175 million people live outside of their country of 
69 Judith Matloff, "South African Blacks Wary of U.S. Kin," Christian Science Monitor 
(November 2, 1995): 1. 
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birth or nati~nality.~' As a percentage of the world population, the number of foreign 
born has increased fifty percent during the last century, from two to three percent. The 
international migration flow has departed from the traditional notions associated with 
European colonization and slave trade. It now includes several sending and receiving 
countries, ethnicities and identities. 
Globalization enhances the practical economic and effective roles of diasporas. 
As they become more integrated into their host societies, diasporas gain power and 
importance. In the age of globalization, diasporas are predominant in what Cohen refers 
to as the "global cities." Global cities are key centers of global economy, transport and 
communications. They become headquarters of transnational corporations and serve as 
hosts to several ethnic groups who are attracted to the global cities in seeking better 
economic conditions. 
Once established, diasporas build relationships and solidarity with the local 
populations. However, a diaspora's relationship with the local population may also be 
antagonistic. Predominance of unemployment and temporary jobs may decrease 
solidarity between groups, which may lead to isolation and group individualism. In 
contrast some diasporas live in global cities, obtain good jobs, thus reinforcing 
globalization. 
Our world is emerging as a global society. Certain elements allow for these 
assertions: 1. individuals have similar needs and that most democratic societies and its 
leaders have embraced this concept; 2. the world is interdependent at technological, 
70 Chris Rudolph, "Globalization, Interdependence and Migration," (Paper presented at the Annual 
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political, economic, and cultural levels; 3.  the planet is now one space, without borders; 4. 
the collapse of the Soviet Union marked an important junction in world politics, whereas 
divisions do not exist anymore, there is no third world; 5. goods, capital, cultural 
practices and beliefs, and communication can now flow across national boundaries with 
ease; and 6. we are on our way to a global civilization where we share values and 
institutional  structure^.^' In addition, Kate Gillespie et. al. point out that as international 
migration and market liberalization expand in the global context, homeland investments 
by diaspora businesses and entrepreneurs will become a significant part of the foreign 
in~es tmen t .~~  
What do these assertions mean, if anything, to migration and diasporas? The 
belief that nation-states and borders are disappearing and the world is becoming a global 
society must be considered. Nation-states can be simply adapting to the demands of a 
new global system. Cohen further explains, "For example, it can be argued that the 
nation-state no longer crystallizes and organizes domestic capital, but that it continues to 
police inward labour flows and seeks to galvanize, although with diminishing capacity, a 
single identity around a national leadership, common citizenship and social exclusion of 
 outsider^."^^ 
Globalization disregards the nature of the capitalist market and its supposed 
"invisible hand." The exchange between states is by far a fair one. As Waters points out, 
" Cohen, 50-57. 
'' Kate Gillespie, Lies1 Riddle, Edward Sayre, and David Sturges, "Diaspora Interest in Homeland 
Investment," Journal ojlnternational Business Studies 30, no. 3 (3rd Quarter, 1999), 623-634. 
73 Cohen, 156.. 
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"globalization is a consequence of the expansion of European culture across the planet 
via settlement, colonization, and cultural mimesis."74 In addition, nationalism as an 
ideology is on the rise. As ethnic movements and diasporas become more organized, 
some will seek exclusive territorial boundaries, which can create some level of conflict. 
What allows diasporas to emerge? 
Robin Cohen has highlighted world economy, international migration, the 
development of global cities, creation of cosmopolitan and local cultures, and 
deterritorialization of social identity, as phenomenon that open up and allow the 
opportunity for diasporas to emerge.75 
Globalization, Migration and its Effects 
The processes of globalization, (trade, production, exchange, labor movement, 
economics, social and political integration) produces winners and losers.76 Some 
countries gain population, others lose. Some population movement is welcomed and 
desired and others are resented and criminalized. 
Globalization produces low returns for some countries and gains for others. The 
losers labor under massive debt burdens while the gainers' economy prosper. Those 
individuals who are able to move from the struggling economies do so to the economic 
powerhouses like the United States. Industrial jobs move to the less developed world 
74 Malcolm Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1996), 3. 
75 Cohen, 157. 
76 Stiglitz, 23-52. 
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while technical jobs go to developed countries. To maintain the labor power for these 
jobs and necessary social services such as healthcare, developed countries pull the most 
skilled from the developing countries, including African immigrants. 77 The 
consequences of this population movement are tremendous. 
Theoretical Concerns and Limitations of Current Literature 
This review of scholarly work on diapora politics has examined the factors that 
allow or force individuals to migrate, create new communities in host countries, and 
maintain or sever socio-economic and political relationships with their homeland. The 
extensive literature suggests there is an increase in scholarly work that analyzes 
theoretical notions on diaspora groups and their trans-state activities. However, the 
review has uncovered a lack of consensus in defining the politicized nature of diasporas. 
Ethnic politics, diaspora politics, and transnationalism have all been used to define the 
political nature under which diasporic communities organize and mobilize in support of 
their community interests as well as the interests of their h~meland.~' For the purposes of 
this literature review, Gabriel Sheffer's Diaspora Politics was used as a theoretical point 
of reference due to its comprehensive nature. 
77 Bruce R. Scott, "The Great Divide in the Global Village" in Developing World, 03/04, 13th ed. 
ed. Robert J. Gsiffiths (Guilford, CT: McGsaw-HilVDuskin, 2003). 
78 Esman (1994), Cohen (1997), Sheffer (2003), and Thomas Owusu, "Transnationalism Among 
African Immigrants in North America: The Case of Ghanaians in Canada." in The New Apican Dzaspora 
in North America Trends, Communzty Building and Adaptation ed Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, Baffom 
K Takyi and John A. Arthur (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 273-285 
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Although there is an increase in scholarly materials on diaspora groups, the 
discussion is still limited within the scope of political science. Analyses on the 
relationship between diasporas, and their access to political power in both their host 
country and homeland as well as factors that impact their transnational activities is still 
narrow. In addition, there is limited information on specific diasporas, their 
organizations, and activism. 
One example of this limitation is the research on contemporary African and 
African-derived diaspora communities. Most scholars in North America tend to lump 
native, Caribbean and African born blacks under the same umbrella. We must recognize 
the cultural, social and political differences among these immigrants by offering case 
studies on the specific groups. In his discussion of modem African diasporas, Colin A. 
Palmer argues for a more in- depth understanding and explanation of the fundamental 
differences in African cultures that affect the ways in which the diasporas manifest 
themselves. He alerts scholars not to, "homogenize the experience of the diverse peoples 
of the modern diaspora." He goes on to explain that, "There are obviously certain 
commonalities, but there are fundamental differences born of the societal context, the 
times, the political, economic, and "racial" circumstances, and so on."" There is a grave 
assumption that blackness is a characteristic that nullifies all the historical and cultural 
differences. 
Another shortcoming is the lumping of all African immigrants in one category. 
The African continent contains fifty-three nations and many hundreds of different 
'' Colin A. Palmer, "Defining and Studying the Modern African Diaspora," The Journal ofNegro 
History 85, no. 12 (Winter-Spring 2002): 27-32 
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ethnicities. Although there are similarities among ethnicities, the differences must also 
be recognized because they also dictate the nature of activism among the African 
diaspora. Additionally, studies tend to focus on trends within the Ghanaian, Nigerian, 
and South African diaspora comm~ni t ies .~~  Further research should focus on additional 
case studies for comparative purposes in order to illustrate the differences between the 
African diaspora. Lastly, a more comprehensive intellectual discussion on the 
intersections of gender, class and diaspora politics must begin to take place.81 The 
discussion on the Cape Verdean diaspora at the global level, in Chapter four as well as 
the new trends of its diaspora in the United States in Chapter five, will enhance the body 
of literature on the African diaspora in general, and its mobilization on behalf of its 
communities abroad and at home. 
80 Dennis Cordell, "Paradoxes of Immigrant Incorporation: High Achievement and Perceptions of 
Discrimination by Nigerians in DallasFort Worth, Texas (U.S.A.)," in Trans-Atlantic Migration, The 
Paradoxes ofExile ed. Toyin Falola and Niyi Afolabi (New York: Routledge, 2008), 13-28. 
Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, "Women and Slave~y in the African Diaspora: A Cross-Cultural 
Approach to Historical Analysis," Sage 3, no. 2 (Fall 1986): 11-15. 
CHAPTER I11 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter serves as the theoretical foundation for this study of the Cape 
Verdean diaspora and of development in their homeland. The core argument is that 
diasporas demonstrate three levels of transnational engagement: 1. Cognitive (i.e. 
listening to the homeland's traditional music, hanging pictures of leaders on wall, 
spiritual activities, observing homeland's festivals and holidays); 2. Material (i.e. 
remittances and goods); and 3. Political (i.e. supporting political campaigns, overseas 
elections, and lobbying). 
The relationship they maintain with their homeland fluctuates over time. 
Conditions in their host country as well as their homeland can prompt or suppress the 
level of activities of the diaspora. The hypothesis is that there are political, economic, 
and social factors which affect diasporas and their levels of involvement. These factors 
change over time, thus affecting the level of involvement towards the homeland. 
However, moments of crisis in the homeland can trigger activities at all levels of 
engagement. Identifying these factors that affect diasporas' involvement and improving 
the structures of institutions can lead to better relationships between the diaspora and the 
homeland. 
Although past and current literature focus on formal networks to track diaspora's 
involvement in homeland development, my study focuses on the work of organizations as 
well as diasporas' informal transnational activities. This study demonstrates that as a 
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labor diaspora, Cape Verdeans always find spaces to cooperate, even if it is at the lowest 
level of intensity to promote their cultural identity in support of their homeland. 
Scholarship on diaspora and development is beginning to gain much needed 
attention among scholars, governments, and the diverse group of actors within 
international communities. These groups recognize the importance of diasporas as actors 
in peace, conflict and development. However, policy makers do not know how to best 
incorporate, mobilize and utilize them in formal policies in peace and development 
strategies so as to maximize them as resources. Most data and scholarly research has 
focused on economic remittances and the consequences of brain drain.' The World Bank 
estimated that remittances reached seventy billion dollars in 2004, one hundred twenty- 
five billion in 2005, and one hundred sixty-seven in 2006.~ Remittances can reduce 
recipient household poverty with spillover to other households, increase investments in 
health and education as well as productive activities, reduce child labor, and increase 
entrepreneurship. Remittances by hometown associations (HTAs) in particular, are used 
to channel resources for development projects in education, health, and infrastructure. 
Diasporas are growing and gaining more notoriety beyond issues related to tourism, 
security concerns, and civil unrest in the international arena, not to say that these issues 
are not a matter of concern. 
Brain drain results in losses to the sending countries as a result of skilled 
migrations. Among others, the most crucial are spill over productivity of other workers, 
' The International Migration Website, http://www iom..int/jahia/Jahia/lang/en/pid/3; accessed 
January 16,2009. 
World Bank Website, http://econ.worldbank..org; accessed January 16,2009 
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public service provisions (education and health), tax revenues, and public debate and 
policy and institution infl~ence.~ As mentioned previously, public health systems in 
Africa are most affected as a result of the brain drain. 
The significance of diasporas also goes beyond remittances as they can be 
mobilized to provide social remittances such as skills transfer, cultural and civic 
awareness and experience. According to the International Organization on Migration 
(IOM), diasporas can also offer development potential for the homeland via social and 
professional networks they have become integrated into their host countries resulting in 
homeland investments in advanced technologies, market intelligence, and business 
 contact^.^ At a national level, migration can decrease unemployment rates as well as 
provide access to foreign exchange. 
Reasons for Diaspora Participation in Development in the Homeland 
Diasporas mobilize partly to express their cultural identities and to maintain 
activities which can benefit its native country. Some groups are driven by a sense of 
obligation towards homeland development while others mobilize due to pride in their 
cultural identity. In the United States for example, the pluralistic nature of its society 
allows diasporas some fluidity to express and mobilize on behalf of their homeland. 
They can also influence U.S. foreign policy decisions, resulting in improved development 
International Migration Website, http://www..imo..org; accessed January 16,2009 
Ibid. 
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strategies and investments in the homeland. However, "the higher the cost to status and 
security in their adopted country, the greater the likelihood that the diaspora community 
will split andlor fail to support the h~meland."~ 
There are three factors that influence diaspora participation in homeland 
development: material, cultural, and organizational resources available. Opportunity 
structures in host countries affect their inclination or motivation to maintain their 
solidarity and exert group influence. Most importantly, the level of economic resources 
in their host country is crucial to remittances and repatriation aspirations. At the 
community level, organizational resources also affect the diasporas' ability to mobilize 
for political change and independent development activities such as hometown 
associations as well as access to political decision-making spheres in host countries. 
While resources and access to political spheres in host countries are important, 
organizational resources also depend on the size and diversity of the diasporic 
community. Creating a sense of solidarity and community identity is a necessary factor 
for effective mobilization. In essence, diasporas must ask themselves for what purposes 
are they mobilizing. 
In his pioneering work on diasporas, Milton J. Esman explains that individuals 
belong to a diaspora as long as they identify with that ethnic community. They may hold 
multiple identities that reflect occupational, political, ideological, and cultural 
Jennifer M Brinkerhoff, ed., Diasporas and Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc ,2008), 6 .  
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ba~k~rounds .~  While they identify with their ethnic origin for a long time, conditions in 
their host country may alter their ethnic solidarity in terms of time and attention they 
devote to their homeland. France, for example, encourages their immigrant population to 
assimilate and it also offers incentives for them to integrate into the French way of life. 
As people choose to follow this route the interaction they maintain with their homeland 
decreases or ceases to exist. In contrast, some do embrace mainstream culture while they 
still maintain attachments with the homeland due to pride in ethnic identity, sense of 
obligation, and nostalgia for their roots and ancestor's culture. 
In some countries, assimilation is not encouraged by the host country or the 
diaspora group. In Malaysia for example, the Chinese and Indian minority population are 
denied full citizenship status by the Malay Muslim maj~r i ty .~  They maintain separate 
identities although they live in the same geographic space. Diasporas may also choose to 
maintain an attachment with the homeland, as small as it may be, whether sentimental or 
actual. In few cases, the homeland is not geographically connected to the diaspora's 
origin such as the case of the Jewish diaspora in the United States and its relationship 
with Israel or the Armenians and the Caucasian country of Armenia, since many ethnic 
Armenians do not originate in that country. "Their loyalties are to the land that the 
current generation of fellow ethnics, owing to historical circumstances, now regard as 
their legitimate homeland."' 
Milton J. Esman, "The Factors Conducive to Diaspora Investment: Comparing China, Armenia, 
and Ireland," in Diasporas and Development ed.. Jennifer. M Brinkerhoff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc., 2008), 99. 
' Ibid.. 
  bid, 101. 
Skilled and Unskilled Diasporas 
Esman divides diasporas into two separate classes, labor and entrepreneurial 
diasporas. He defines labor diasporas as unskilled individuals with little formal or no 
formal education, or no business experience such as North Africans in France and 
Mexicans in the United States who work in low paying job. On the other hand, 
entrepreneurial diasporas are people with business experience and skills who desire to 
start businesses in their countries and seek the right opportunity to do so, such as the case 
of the Jews in the United States and the Chinese in Indonesia. Most entrepreneurial 
diasporas start at the bottom and work their way up the socio-economic ladder. Through 
education and experience second generation diasporas might emerge as professionals and 
increase their income status in comparison to the f ~ s t  generation. 
The diasporas' capabilities in the host country and the policies in their homeland 
fosters an environment for them to contribute to the economic development of their 
homeland. The purpose of transnational migrations that create diasporic communities is 
to create better economic opportunities. Their earned income is sent back home to their 
families. While the amount of some of these remittances may be small they add up and 
contribute to development, although little is devoted to economic development of the 
country as a whole. While remittances make up for a large amount of money flows at a 
global level, diasporas' remittances are not large enough to make substantial change. 
Once generations of diasporas are integrated into their host country the need to send 
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money back home is not as pressing. Those that maintain a connection with the 
homeland do so via charitable donations. 
Diasporas and Economic Development in Their Homeland 
Three factors affect a diaspora's ability to contribute to the economic 
development of their ancestral homeland: investment climate in the country of origin, 
resources available to the members of the diaspora, and the inclinations of the members 
of the diaspora. The climate in the homeland is favorable if the government welcomes 
foreign direct investment, protects private property, enforces contracts, permits the 
remittances of profits, and provides large internal market or opportunity for exporting. 
Secondly, most members of labor diasporas such as the case of Cape Verdeans in the 
United States, lack sufficient capital resources for investment in homeland for several 
generations. They might not have enough surplus to remit to both families and social and 
political institutions. Entrepreneurial diasporas, however, can accomplish this once they 
become successful. Thirdly, diasporas might not want to support homeland development 
if they have negative memories of being oppressed in that homeland. Additionally, 
others might be fully integrated or assimilated into the host country and have no desire to 
be involved with the homeland as they do not identify with it or its cultural identity 
because of active rejection of that identity or assimilation into a new identity in the land 
of immigration. Other individuals who are culturally and socially integrated in their host 
country might feel a sense of obligation to their homeland and choose to provide 
assistance in homeland development. 
Diasporas and Development 
In order for any society to experience true development the following must occur: 
access to education, health services, and material asset accumulation. As previously 
discussed, development is a condition that creates an enabling environment for people to 
enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives. Individuals in a developed society enjoy a good 
quality of life, freedoms, and have the opportunity for upward mobility and are able to 
improve their material condition. 
Immigrants' economic link to their homeland include at least four practices 
involving spending or investing capital: family remittances; demand of services such as 
telecommunications and consumer goods; charitable donations to hometown 
organizations to raise funds for the community; and lastly, capital in~estment.~ 
According to a study on immigrant practices, Latinos and Filipinos in the U.S. remit three 
hundred dollars on a monthly basis to their homeland while Southeast Asians in Japan 
send roughly six hundred seventy-one. Ghanaians in Europe remit at a rate of four 
hundred dollars bi-monthly. In terms of consumer goods eighty percent of Latinos in the 
U.S. purchase phone cards to call their relatives for two hours each month. Lastly, 
donations to hometown organizations account for one to two hundred dollars spent 
annually per person. In the case of Mexico these donations account for fifty million 
Manuel Orozco. "Diasporas and Development: Issues and Impediments," in Diasporas & 
Development. Exploring the Potential ed. Jennifer M. Br inkerhoff (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2008), 207-230. 
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dollars of the donations. Table 10 offers an overview of the figures for all migrants in the 
U.S.: 
Table 10. Immigrant Economic Practices (annual expenses in U.S. Dollars) 
Family Remittances Donations Consumption Capital Investment 
Household Economy Community Trade and Services, Property and Other 
($2,700) ($10,000) Retail ($3,000) ($5,000) 
Source: Manuel Orozco, "Diasporas and Development: Issues and Impediments," in Jennifer M. 
Brinkerhoff, ed Diasporas & Development Exploring the Potential, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2008,209. 
Table 10 shows that the impact immigrant communities have on the economy of 
both their host countries and homeland cannot be ignored. In the case of large diaspora 
groups it is imperative to create development strategies and policies. Current scholarship 
has offered limited theoretical perspectives on how to link diasporas to the development 
of their homeland. The figures on the table 11 from the Ghanaian diaspora in the United 
States further demonstrate this point: 
Table 11. Ghanaians Expenditures in the U.S. 
Percent Number Annual CostIExpense Total Expenditures 
per person (U.S. Dollar) (US,. Dollars) 
Call on Average 50 100,000 432 43,200,000 
80 minutes 
Send over $300 60 120,OO 4,800 576,000,000 
Buy home 80 160,000 200 
country goods 
Travel once a 5 0 100,000 1,200 
year and spend 
over $1,000 80 160,000 1,000 
Have a mortgage 80 40,000 
loan 
Belong to a HTA 20 40,000 200 8,000,000 
Source: Manuel Orozco, With Micah Bump, Rachel Fedewa, and Katya Sienkiewicz. Diasporas, 
Development, and Transnational Integration: - Ghanaians in the U,S., UK,. and Germany. washington, 
DC: Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University, and the Inter-American 
Dialogue. Report commissioned for Citizens International U,.S. Agency for International Development, 
October 3,2005. 
Manuel Orozco's analysis offers five recommendations for linking diasporas to 
development: 1. distinguish three dimensions of diasporas' links to development: 
development in the diaspora, development through the diaspora, and development by the 
diaspora; 2. Understand and target the corresponding economic activities for each 
dimension; 3. Recognize the limits to diasporas' economic contributions to development 
and support necessary enabling environments; 4. Acknowledge the varied levels of 
participation within diasporas and not expect all migrants to participate in development 
activities; and lastly 5. Develop institutionalized communication mechanism with 
diasporas. 
The three dimensions of diasporas' links to development framework defines 
development in the diaspora as the diasporas' use of networks in the host country which 
include the formation of ethnic businesses and cultural ties as well as social mobilization. 
Development through the diaspora is defined as how diasporic communities utilize their 
diverse global connections beyond the locality to facilitate economic and social well- 
being. Lastly, development by the diaspora is the result of the diasporas' flows of ideas, 
capital, and political support to benefit the migrant's home country. Table 12 offers a 
detailed description of these dimensions: 
Table 12. Three Dimensions of Diasporas' Links to Development 
Development In the Diaspora Through the Diaspora By the Diaspora 
Activities 
Family Remittances Banking the unbanked Financial Money Transfer 
intermediation; Operations (MTOs) 
micro finance 
institutions 
Consumption of Supporting demand Supply of home- Small-business 
goods and Services for products country commodities development 
Investment of Capital Setting up minority- Technical training in Manufactured goods; 
owned businesses remittance-receiving nostalgic trade; 
areas tourism 
Cash and in-Kind Capacity building Project identification; Social philanthropy 
donations networking 
Source: Manuel Orozco. "Diasporas and Development: Issues and Impediments," in Jennifer M. 
Brinkerhoff, ed. Diasporas & Development: Exploring the Potential, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2008), 2 12.. 
In addition to identifying the different areas of diasporas' link to development, a 
link must also be created between development and migrant economic practices such as 
remittances and investments. Nevertheless, once these links are identified their limitation 
in promoting development must also be recognized. For example, remittances only 
131 
provide short-term relief to the migrants' families and function best when the local 
economy works effectively.1° Orozco points out that sustainable development through 
the diaspora depends on reinforcing policies which deal with inequality in the homeland 
since remittances reduce poverty only to a certain extent. Additionally, investments only 
work when there is a fostering political and economic environment for them to do so. 
When local governments and economy function effectively it encourages trade and 
investment not only for diaspora groups but also other foreign investors. 
In linking diasporas to development one must also consider the diverse levels of 
participation exercised by the diaspora. Only one fourth of the individuals who remit to 
their homeland belong to formal diaspora organizations. Individuals tend to be more 
active within family spheres or through personal investments. Thus, it is not realistic to 
assume that all members of the diaspora group will be involved and with the same level 
of intensity. 
Lastly, institutionalized forms of communication are important in creating 
development partnerships. Governments should do more to engage diaspora groups and 
their organizations in development strategies. They must also demonstrate a high level of 
commitment towards these initiatives as well. Government institutions can create 
dialogue with diaspora organization leadership, ensure there are institutional resources 
available for policy outreach, create formal communication avenues thus legitimizing 
contact with diaspora groups and lastly, create policy agenda that is mutually beneficial 
and meets the needs of both the government and the diaspora. 
lo Orozco, 207. 
Obstacles in Linking Diaspora to Development 
Development experts do not think migrants can effectively participate in 
development initiatives. Due to the lack of information on specific diaspora 
organizations and their practices, there are uninformed expectations about the results that 
these groups can achieve. In addition, diasporas are limited in terms of knowledge and 
expertise in how to become part of the development process. Those in the academic field 
have not developed an approach to directly link diaspora and development. Thus, there is 
limited knowledge, theory, and method on how to best create this link. Lastly, lack of 
communication between all the donors (governments and organizations) also adds to the 
mystery surrounding diasporas and their direct role in the development of their homeland. 
Conditions in the homeland may prevent diasporas from fully participating in the 
development of its homeland. In the case of the Cape Verdean community and its arrival 
in the United States in the 1800s, Cape Verde was still under Portuguese rule. Cape 
Verdeans were fleeing an oppressive colonial regime as well as famine and poverty, 
results of long periods of drought. It would be difficult for Cape Verdeans in the United 
States to support the development of their homeland due to Cape Verde's political 
situation as a Portuguese colony and as newly arrived immigrants at the initial phase of 
integration into American society. 
Conditions in the host country may also create obstacles for the establishment of 
the diaspora. As Cape Verdeans arrived in the United States, they faced the same harsh 
realities of American racism as African Americans. Cape Verdeans encountered a 
system that discriminated against people solely on the basis of the color of the arbitrary 
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categories of race. The strict racial stratification in the United States created a major 
divide within the Cape Verdean society because they saw themselves as Portuguese 
citizens, which for Americans meant being white Europeans. Cape Verdeans were placed 
in the same racial and social categories as African-Americans. Some Cape Verdeans, if 
they could, based on their light skin tone "passed" for whites. Most, however, could not 
escape this reality. This meant they had limited access to education, employment 
opportunities and place of residence. The discriminatory nature of the U.S. society 
created major obstacles for the foundational establishment of the Cape Verdean 
community and its long term connection to the homeland. While other historical 
diasporas such as the Jews arrived and created well-established and long lasting 
communities, Cape Verdeans and other immigrant communities (mostly of color) were 
discriminated against thus retarding their level of political and economic growth within 
the American system. 
During the early 1900s, while Cape Verdeans were at the genesis of their activism 
towards their homeland, the Irish communities had already taken control of the political 
machines in major U.S. cities like Boston, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia. They 
had access to secondary and higher education and thus, able to find jobs as fire fighters, 
police officers, and teachers, a sphere that African-Americans were generally not allowed 
to enter. At this time, the Cape Verdean community came together on behalf of their 
homeland and raised money to buy foods and goods in an effort to relieve the country of 
famine, which was wiping out much of the islands population. Although the community 
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raised money, due to their economic and social conditions in the United States, the 
support they were able to give to Cape Verde was limited. 
The Irish diaspora has been used as a classical example of an ethnic community of 
migrants in the United States who faced discrimination before becoming a successful and 
well-established community. In his discussion of the Irish diaspora, Noel Ignatiev 
demonstrates how the Irish were assimilated as whites into the American society and 
links the embracing of white supremacy and Irish success in nineteenth century 
America." His discussion helps us conclude that given the opportunity, all those who 
faced ruthless racial discrimination within American society, would jump at the chance of 
becoming a part of the main stream white society in the way the Irish eventually 
accomplished. 
What's Next? The Future of Diasporas' Role in Development 
Homeland governments can legitimize diaspora groups by creating policies and 
developing necessary conditions in both the home and host countries. This fosters an 
environment conducive to engaging the diaspora in development processes in the 
homeland. For example, the Dominican and Cape Verdean diaspora communities in the 
U.S. enjoy dual citizenship rights thus are able to impact policies in both the host and 
home countries. In addition to political rights, diasporas can also benefit from the 
creation of financial institutions where remittance recipients can save or invest money. 
The objective is to be able to track the amount of money flow coming into the homeland 
l 1  Noel Ignatiev, How The Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 1995), 1-20 
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through formal channels. Additionally, homeland governments can also build business 
relationships with money transfer companies as well as banks in order to create easy 
access and improve costs of sending money back home. 
Hometown organizations should be viewed as agents of development if diasporas 
are to be successfully linked to development. Government institutions as well as non- 
governmental organizations should work with hometown organizations and support their 
initiatives. Other policy areas that should be engaged are tourism and trade of cultural 
consumer goods. Institutional policy can support local artisan businesses and enhance 
their productivity and marketing skills in local markets or wherever they exist. However, 
for all these recommendations to take place, the key actors (governments, private sectors, 
NGOs, international donor agencies, and HTAs) in linking diasporas to development 
must work together and support each other's efforts. Current efforts in linking diaspora 
to development have been launched by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Ford Foundation. 
One of the initiatives by the Ford Foundation includes research on Mexican women's use 
of remittances. The World Bank is also working with African nations and their diaporic 
communities towards finding new ways to finance development in Sub-Saharan ~ f i i c a . ' ~  
This chapter has laid out the theoretical foundations for this study on diasporas 
and development, particularly the Cape Verdean diaspora and its role on development at 
home. It makes the argument that while certain diasporas maintain a connection to their 
12 Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra, and Sonia Plaza, "Beyond Aid: New Sources and Innovative 
Mechanisms for Financing Development in Sub-Saharan Africa." Accessed via the World Bank at 
http://econ .worldbank .o~~/WBSITEIEXTERNAL/EXTDEC/O,,CO~~~~~MDK:~ 16785 10-pagePK:64 16540 1 
-piPK:64165026-theSitePK:469372,00 html; accessed January 19,2009. 
homeland, the intensity of this connection varies with time and according to the 
conditions existent in the homeland and the host country. For example, in a time of crisis 
such as war, famine or drought, diasporas might activate their involvement with their 
home, such as in the case of Afghans in the United States. The research also states that 
the desire to support homeland development is determined by whether a diaspora is 
considered a labor or a skilled diaspora, thus affecting the level of human, social, and 
capital resources available to them. However, we must not assume that all diasporas are 
willing to be involved in the development discourse. One major conclusion is that the 
size of the diaspora might not always matter. For example, Mexico has a large diaspora 
but they are not as active in the political process of their homeland.13 
The existing theory linking diasporas to homeland development remains limited 
to discussions on the impact of remittances and the brain drain on sending countries.14 
The pioneering work of Jennifer Brinkerhoff et. al. sheds some light on the issue and how 
to best approach it. It highlights diasporas as essential actors in the development process 
of their homeland. It also calls for the collaboration between diasporas, non- 
governmental organizations, and state institutions if true progress is to be made. State 
institutions should forge partnerships with money transfer companies and other agencies 
in order to facilitate the avenues used by diasporas in maintaining connections with their 
homeland. In this regard, state institutions should engage diasporas and their 
organizations in creating projects that best meet each other's needs. Lastly, research on 
13 Agustin Escobar Latapi and Eric Jansen, "Migration, the Diaspora and Development: The Case 
of Mexico," International Institute for Labour Studies (2006): 1-2 1. 
l4 V. N. Balasubrarnanyam and Yingqi Wei, "The Diaspora and Development," The World 
Economy 29, no, 1 1 (November 2006): 1599-1609. 
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diasporas and their political mobilization via informal networks remains understudied. 
This is an important aspect of transnational political and economic activities. My 
research on the Cape Verdean diaspora uncovers some of these informal transnational 
practices which can greatly contribute to the literature on diasporas and development. 
CHAPTER IV 
CAPE VERDE'S DIASPORIC COMMUNITIES 
This chapter explores the patterns of migration among Cape Verdeans and the 
communities they have formed in different host countries. It focuses on specific diaspora 
communities: in Portugal, Holland, and Argentina. In addition to the United States, 
Portugal and Holland have been major destinations of choice for Cape Verdean migrants. 
Argentina is also noted as an understudied area of the Cape Verdean diaspora. Although 
records show Cape Verdeans have migrated to Argentina since the 1920s, little is known 
about the dynamics of this diasporic community.' The objective here is to offer a broad 
overview of the transnational political practices among Cape Verdeans in Europe and 
Latin America. 
While research on the Cape Verdean diaspora remains limited, scholars have 
focused mainly on the sociological aspects of its transnationalist practices.2 In addition to 
the works of Richard Lobban, Marilyn Halter, Deirdre Meintel Machado, the work of 
Luis Batallha and Jorgen Carling have added considerably to the scholarship on Cape 
Verdean emigration, particularly to Portugal and Holland. Other scholars who have 
written on the Cape Verdean diaspora include Augusto Nascimento (S5o Tom6 and 
Principe), Marta Maffia (Argentina), Jacqueline Andall (Italy), Lisa Akesson (Sweden), 
and Rocio Moldes Farelo and Luzia Oca Gonzklez, ( ~ ~ a i n ) . ~  Still, little is known 
1 Marta Maffia, "Cape Verdeans in Argentina," in Transnational Archipelago. Perspectives on 
Cape Verdean Migration and Diaspora ed. Luis Batalha and Jorgen Carling (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2008), 47-53. 
Luis Batalha and Jorgen Carling, eds, Transnatzonal Archipelago Perspectives on Cape 
Verdean Migration and Diaspora (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008). 
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regarding the degree of engagement by Cmigr6 Cape Verdeans in their host countries as 
well as the factors that suppress or motivate their desire to be involved in the 
development of their homeland. 
The Historical Relationship: Cape Verde and Migration 
Migration is an important part of the formation of Cape Verdean society and it 
continues to shape the islands' development in modem times. Opportunities and desire 
for migration arose from Cape Verde's strategic location in the geography of trade and 
empire building as well as the lack of natural resources and agricultural base.' It is 
estimated that between 1774 and 1975, one hundred twenty thousand Cape Verdeans 
perished as a result of drought and famine.' Today there are over five hundred thousand 
Cape Verdeans living throughout the world, exceeding the domestic population (434,263 
in the 2000   ens us).^ Pedro Gois argues that the Cape Verdean diaspora has forged a 
relationship of co-dependency, often times based on an illusion. He makes reference to 
Anderson's concept of imagined community, as he sees Cape Verde "not only as an 
These scholars' analyses of the Cape Verdean diaspora are part of the edited book by Batalha 
and Carling (2008) Research on Cape Verdean communities in these particular countries is very limited 
and focuses on specific sociological topics such as language and music. 
Jorgen Carling, "Aspiration and Ability in International Migration: Cape Verdean Experiences 
of Mobility and Immobility," (Dissertation and Theses, 200115, Center for Development and the 
Environment, University of Oslo.) 
Raymond Almeida, "Nos Ku Nos: The Transnational Cape Verdean Community," 
http://www.umass.edu/specialPrograms/caboverde/cansnat,html; accessed December 1 1,2007. 
JOSB Leitiio, "A Diaspora Caboverdiana no Espa~o  Europeu e o Seu Papel na Criagiio de Lagos 
Culturais, Econdmicos e Politicos," http://www.caboverde.vozdipovo-on1ine.com accessed December 11, 
2007) 
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imagined community, but also as a truly imagined nation, or even an imaginary nation 
that flows within a particular and imagined world: the Cape Verdean ~ o r l d . " ~  
The dispersion of native Cape Verdeans began in the fifteenth century, through 
forced migration of the slave trade which was replaced by spontaneous forms of 
migration in the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, when slavery was abolished. Cape 
Verdean migration throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries assumed different 
routes, as Cape Verdeans searched for new destinations. Because of its archipelago- 
form, Cape Verde's migratory process had specific features with different migration 
flows and destinations by islands of origin (i.e. Santiago Island to Lisbon and Siio 
Vicente Island to Rotterdam). Table 13, on the next page, illustrates Cape Verde's 
migration flows between 1920 and 1959: 
' Pedro G6is, "Low Intensity Transnationalism: the Cape Verdian Case," Stichproben (Wiener 
Zeitschrift fur Kritische Afiikastudien Nr. 8, 5), 2005. 
Table 13. Cape Verdean Migration (unforced) by Destination and Period 
Destination 1920- 1945 1927-1 945 1946-1959 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
United States 18,629 67.2 1,408 13.9 538 7.9 
Brazil, Argentina, 1,968 7 , l  1,203 11.9 86 1.3 
Uruguay, and Chile 
Angola and 366 1.6 352 3.5 6 0.2 
Mozambique 
S%o Tome and Principe 1,532 5.5 133 1.3 2 0.1 
Senegal and Gambia 1,428 5.1 1,772 17.5 25 1 3.7 
Lisbon, Azores, and 1,232 4.4 3,336 33..0 3,933 57.8 
Madeira 
Other countries 363 1.3 719 7.1 1,087 15.8 
Total 27,765 100 10,120 100 6,804 100 
Source: Marzia Grassi, "Cabo Verde Pelo Mundo: 0 Genero e a Diaspora Cabo-Verdiana," Institute de 
Ciencia Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, 2006 
Emigration has created Cape Verdean communities in countries such as the 
United States, Holland, Portugal, Italy, Argentina, and France. There are over half a 
million Cape Verdeans living in other countries, with two hundred fifty thousand in the 
United States, one hundred and six thousand in Portugal, thirty-seven thousand five 
hundred in the Netherlands, thirty-five thousand in Angola, twenty-two thousand five 
hundred in Senegal, and fifty thousand distributed throughout Spain, Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, and ~ e r m a n ~ . '  However, 
Mario de Queiroz, "Migration: A key Aspect of the Country's History," Inter Press Service 
News Agency, http://www.ipsnews.net; accessed October 23,2007. 
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the population could indeed be much larger given that these figures do not reflect 
undocumented migrants. 
These groups have been important in financing Cape Verde's economy. The 
country relies on remittances from its diaspora for survival. In 1980, remittances 
accounted for eighty-six percent of the country's gross national i n ~ o m e . ~  Cash 
remittances fluctuate with economic conditions in both the homeland and host country, 
but on average currently constitute twenty-five to thirty percent of the annual gross 
national product. 
Diaspora Inclusion: Cape Verde's Government Efforts 
The Cape Verdean government has also recognized the importance of the Cape 
Verdean diaspora as an "international community of Cape Verdeans." The government 
includes a secretary of state for immigration affairs as well as ministries of culture and 
education that specifically deal with issues pertaining to the immigrant population. 
Founded in 1986, the Instituto de Apoio e Protec~io ao Emigrante, Institute of Emigrant 
Support and Protection, renamed the Instituto das Comunidades, Institute of the 
Communities in 2001 .lo It promotes the crioulo culture and also assists the organization 
of migrant communities. The new constitution allows Cape Verdean citizens dual 
nationality and permits emigrants to vote in Cape Verde's presidential elections. The 
diasporas were allotted three seats in parliament in 1991 with an increase to six seats in 
9 Almeida. 
lo Instituto das Comunidades at http://www .ic.cv 
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1995: two for the Americas, two for Europe, and two for ~fr ica ."  Table 15 shows the 
results of the 2006 presidential elections: 
Table 14.2006 Cape Verde Presidential Elections Results 
(Immigrant Communities) 
Continent Registered Abstentions Voters Results 
Voters Blank Null Pedro Carlos 
Pires Veiga 
- 
Africa 8,429 4,810 3,619 8 71 2,608 932 
Americas 11,419 8,622 2,797 4 67 2,035 69 1 
Europe & Others 3 1,686 26,758 4,928 24 52 2,599 2,253 
Total 51,534 40,190 11,344 36 190 7,242 3,876 
Source: Cape Verde National Election Commission, http://www cne cvlresult-pre/result php, accessed on 
November 30,2007 
As observed in the above table, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde 
(PAICV), presidential candidate Pedro Pires won a majority of the votes over the 
Movement for Democracy (MPD), candidate Carlos Veiga. The results conclude that 
PAICV continues to receive the support of the diaspora community. 
" de Montclos 
144 
In comparison to other African countries, Cape Verde's diaspora is relatively well 
organized. The emigrant population played a significant role in ending the one-party 
system in 1991 as well as supporting the struggle against Portuguese colonial regime. 
While MPD won the democratic elections in 1991, it lost the diaspora's confidence with 
allegations of mismanagement and corruption, leading to the reinstatement of the PAICV 
in 200 1 .I2 
MPD was also less able to mobilize the diaspora and gain its support. Cape 
Verdeans in the United States supported the PAICV. During the independence struggle 
Cape Verdean Americans were more educated and financially well-off than other 
communities in the diaspora. Unlike Cape Verdeans in France or Portugal they were also 
more organized in the struggle against colonialism. The newer members of the diaspora 
in Europe, disillusioned by the one-party system were more apt to support PAICV's 
opposition while the older diaspora generation in the U.S. for example, continued their 
support for the PAICV. 
Marc-Antoine Perouse deMontclos argues that shared commonality based on 
ethnic identity, dispersion of its immigrants, and the creation of organizations is not 
enough to create a unified political lobby. He adds that while the concentration of Cape 
Verdeans is a strong point, dispersion is an obstacle to a serious Cape Verdean political 
diaspora constituency on behalf of the homeland. He argues, 
Some districts like New Bedford, Boston, or Delfshaven, which accommodates 
almost half of the Cape Verdeans in Rotterdam, are strongholds where proximity 
helps to foster a sense of communal identity. Yet in France, the 21,000 Cape 
Verdeans who were counted in the 1999 census are more widely scattered, 
l2 Ibid 
especially in the suburbs around Paris like Clamart, Sarcelles, Clichy, and 
Malakoff. Another factor is that the diaspora in Europe did not always settle in 
the country of arrival, and therefore became more dispersed.13 
According to deMontclos, the number of Cape Verdeans in these cities does not mean 
they have a strong link to the homeland. Fewer than half of all Cape Verdeans in the 
United States speak Crioulo. Less than nineteen percent of Cape Verdeans in Portugal 
belong to Cape Verdean organizations (most of which focus on cultural activities and not 
politics).14 In addition, only forty percent of the Cape Verdean population in Portugal 
exercises their right to vote in the host country, while the number who cast absentee votes 
in elections in the homeland is much lower (eighteen percent). In France, seventy percent 
of the population was eligible to vote in Cape Verde's 2001 elections. However, few 
actually registered. The Cape Verdean diaspora seems to be politically apathetic given 
these statistics on voting history and other forms of political participation. 
Migration Cycles 
Cape Verdean emigration is divided into three migratory cycles:15 From the end 
of the nineteenth century to the first decade of the twentieth century, Cape Verdeans 
migrated to the Americas, mainly to the United States. During this time, there was also 
substantial migration to S5o Tom6 and Principe and other parts of the Portuguese colonial 
l3 Ibid. 
l4 Ibid. 
'' Gois, 257. 
146 
empire such as Angola and Guine-Bissau. This cycle was thus divided into two 
migratory flows: North to the United States and South to Siio Tom6 and Principe and 
Angola. The second cycle took place from the 1920s until the end of World War 11. Two 
major trends occurred: a reduction in the number of exits and shift in migratory 
destination to Brazil, Argentina, Senegal and Gambia. Migration within the Portuguese 
colonial empire continued to be significant for Cape Verdeans. The period following the 
end of World War I1 to present time marks the last of the migration cycles. In this cycle, 
the main destinations were the Netherlands, Portugal, France, Luxembourg, Italy, 
Switzerland, Spain, and Germany. During this period, migration to the United States was 
also reactivated. This migration cycle has different features: A first flow towards the 
Netherlands; a second flow towards Portugal; a third flow towards Italy; and a fourth 
flow towards other European countries. The fifth flow follows other previous migratory 
destinations. 
Europe has been the main destination for Cape Verdeans since 1960. The 2000 
census highlighted between the periods between 1995 and 2000, fifty percent of 
emigrants were destined mainly to portugal.16 The United States was the second major 
destination of choice, followed by France, and Holland. There were also significant 
flows to Italy, Spain, and Luxembourg. Economic growth in post-war Europe as well as 
the need for labor attracted Cape Verdeans to the continent. In Portugal, for example, 
there was a flow of Portuguese workers to more industrialized parts of Europe (Germany, 
France, Switzerland, and Belgium), thus prompting the demand for unskilled labor in 
l6 Ibid, 258. 
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~ o r t u ~ a 1 . l ~  The port city of Rotterdam in Holland was an attractive destination for 
workers. Towards the end of the 1960s, nine thousand documented Cape Verdeans lived 
in Rotterdam, a few thousands in Lisbon and Paris, a few hundreds in Italy (mostly 
women living in Rome, Naples, and ~ i l an ) . "  Rotterdam and Lisbon were the main 
destination cities for Cape Verdean emigration to Europe. 
The Desire to Migrate 
More than fifty percent of all Cape Verdeans wish to go abroad.lg These Cape 
Verdeans cite unemployment, having relatives abroad and recurring remittances as 
factors in their desire to emigrate. Some desire to go abroad, work hard, and come back 
to their homeland. The examples of many Cape Verdeans who have returned, built big 
homes, and drive fancy cars, motivate those on the islands, specifically the youth, to seek 
the same dreams. 
Since independence, strict immigration policies in potential destination countries 
have challenged the Cape Verdean dream of emigration. Emigration declined from two 
percent in 1970 to 0.5 percent in the 1990s.~' Cape Verde's population has tripled from 
the 1970s to the 1990s, with a growth rate of twenty-five percent per year. Cape Verdean 
l7 Luis Batalha, The Cape Verdean Diaspora in Portugal Colonial Subjects in a Postcolonial 
World (Lanham: Lexington Brooks, 2004), 87-88. 
l8 Marzia Grassi, "Cabo Verde Pelo Mundo: 0 GBnero e a Diaspora Cabo-Verdiana," (Instituto de 
Ciencia Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, 2006), 15. 
l9 Jorgen Carling, "Cape Verde: Towards the End of Emigration," (International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo, November 2002) 
20 Ibid. 
authorities expect emigration flows to decline in years to come as a result of strict 
immigration laws in the countries of destination. 
In terms of gender, there has been a balance in emigration flows. The shift 
changed from individual labor to family-related migration. Cape Verdean men settled in 
northwestern Europe during the 1960s and 1970s and brought their wives and children in 
the 1980s.~' During this period, single women also migrated. While men migrated to the 
Netherlands and Portugal, women tended to choose Italy, although not exclusively 
(others still migrated to Portugal). These places were major destinations for Cape 
Verdean domestic workers, both documented and undocumented. Table 15 illustrates the 
gender imbalance within migration flows to Italy: 
Table 15. Cape Verdean Residents in Italy by Sex, 1994- 1998 
Year Total Men Percentage Women Percentage 
1994 3,214 823 25.6 2,391 74.4 
1995 3,386 912 26.9 2,474 73.1 
1996 3,658 1050 28.7 2,608 71.3 
1997 4,222 1274 30.2 2,948 69.8 
1998 3,974 834 21.0 3,140 79.0 
Source: Marzia Grassi, "Cabo Verde Pelo Mundo: 0 Genero e a Diaspora Cabo-Verdiana," Instituto de 
Ci6ncia Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, 2006, 16. 
21 Ibid 
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The table highlights a steady four-year increase in Cape Verdean female immigrant 
population in Italy, almost triple of the male population. 
In more current times, women in Italy are now employed as hourly domestic 
workers instead of live-in domestic workers. In her research, Jacqueline Andall points 
out that although the domestic sector wages are higher in northern Italy, this has not led 
to Cape Verdean women's increased internal mobility due to strong family ties in the 
cities they predominantly reside.22 
Wendy Pojmann's research on women migrants in Italy offers great insight on 
Cape Verdean women as domestic workers and their formal networks in Rome. What 
was once a male-dominated phenomenon, migration in Italy became female oriented. 
Large numbers of women, including Cape Verdeans, Filipinas, and Moroccans began 
arriving in Italy in the 1960s and 1 9 7 0 s . ~ ~  c c o r d i n ~  to Pojmann, the formation of 
women's associations in Rome was largely due to the lack of assistance these women 
received from the Italian government, unprepared to handle the massive migration of 
female domestic workers. The Cape Verdean Women's Association in Italy was founded 
in 1988. The women wanted to self-organize and create awareness on being part of a 
predominantly female migrant group. While a Cape Verdean community organization 
existed, Pojmann emphasizes three factors which motivated the women to launch the 
women's association: 1. the women developed a consciousness of their gender-based 
22 Jacqueline Andall, "Cape Verdeans in Italy," in Transnational Archipelago Perspectives on 
Cape Verdean Migration and Diaspora ed. Luis Batalha and Jorgen Carling (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2008), 81-90. 
23 Wendy Pojmann, "Organizing Women Migrants: The Filipino and Cape Verdean Women's 
Associations in Rome," Migration Letters 4, no. I: 29-39. 
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needs. They wanted more detailed and practical solutions to their problems; 2. in 1986, 
Law 943 was passed in Italy, recognizing the rights of immigrant communities to 
organize. This law opened the doors to immigrant groups' full participation in the 
political process; and lastly, 3. an Italian women's trade union supported the Cape 
Verdean Women's Association with, "office space as well as with a model for organizing 
on behalf of women's  interest^."^^ The case of Cape Verdean women and their formal 
networks demonstrates a grassroots level of political and social consciousness. They 
demanded their rights not only as members of the immigrant community but also as 
members of the larger Italian community. 
The migration of women to Italy also forged a new level of transnationalist 
networking. Cape Verdean males in the Holland often vacationed and visited the women 
in Italy. This relationship between Cape Verdeans in Holland, Portugal, and Italy formed 
the Cape Verdean European community. Cape Verdeans came together during social 
events and exchanged economic and cultural goods. The regional integration of the 
European community, the European Union (EU), has made it much easier for the 
formation of a stronger community of Cape Verdeans in Europe. It has facilitated 
migratory circulation in Europe. 
There are several actors responsible for building the transnational nature of this 
relationship. Women are important actors in this process. They bring the different 
diaspora communities together and also connect them with the homeland.25 Female 
24 Ibid., 34 
25 Gbis, 260. 
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entrepreneurs in the infoimal market carry traditional Cape Verdean products to be sold 
to the diaspora and in turn, bring back to the islands consumer goods such as clothes, 
shoes, domestic appliances, foods as well as other products otherwise inaccessible to the 
poor. Gois also identifies musicians, students, and families as important actors in 
maintaining linkages between the diaspora communities. 
In his analysis, Pedro Gois highlights the distinctions between immigrants in 
Europe or Senegal, the Kriolu or newly arrived emigrant in the U.S., on the one hand, and 
the first wave of emigrants in the U.S., referred to as the Merkanu (the American) as well 
as the Cape Verdeans living in countries such as Siio Tom6 and Principe or Brazil. G6is 
argues that the Kriolu has remained in constant connection with his homeland and other 
communities in the diaspora through what he calls transnational practices. The Merkanu 
however, has maintained a lower level of transnational practices. Transnational practices 
refer to the social, cultural, and economic exchanges between the communities in the 
diaspora. He also calls attention to the Cape Verdean community in Siio Tom6 and 
Principe whose lack of economic capital accounts for its low level of transnational 
practices. Gois, however, does not explain what accounts for the shift in transnational 
practices. He also fails to clearly identify the nature of the economic and political 
transnational practices which may indeed impact diaspora political visibility in the host 
country as well as contributions to the homeland. He focuses on the social practices, 
which account for contact with the homeland and other diaspora communities via 
vacation visits, exchange of goods, telephone calls, emails, and letters. 
